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Patent protection grants the patent holder with a market monopoly, free from market 
competition allowing the patentee to charge any price; therefore medicines are sold at prices 
much higher than the marginal cost of production and distribution. The connection between 
international trade and intellectual property has aggravated human rights and public health 
concerns surrounding the inaccessibility of essential medicines. The World Trade 
Organisation‘s Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement is 
an international instrument which has greatly impacted intellectual property rights protection 
and access to medicine. It has globalized intellectual property law by obliging all Members to 
subscribe to the minimum international standards of protection for intellectual property. 
South Africa is an example of the issues faced whilst attempting to bring their domestic laws 
into compliance with the Agreement. The government had to attempt to strike a balance 
between creating an effective intellectual property infrastructure whilst realizing the 
therapeutic needs of those affected by HIV/AIDS. 
The South African Patents Act 57 of 1978 did not comply with the Agreement and was 
subsequently amended in order to bring its patent legislation in full compliance with the 
Agreement.  Currently, South Africa grants patents for new uses or formulations of existing 
medicines consequently lengthening the period of patent monopoly by allowing 
pharmaceutical companies to obtain new patents for slight modifications to existing 
medicines. It is submitted that South Africa‘s patent legislation is more extensive than is 
necessary under international law, examples of this being disclosure standards and the 
process for compulsory licensing.  In addition, it has not made use of provisions in its 
existing law to take measures to improve access to essential medicines, nor has it 
implemented legislative amendments consequent to the flexibilities established in the Doha 
Declaration. 
 
This dissertation seeks to review the steps South Africa has taken in its compliance with the 
TRIPS Agreement with respect to the relevant intellectual property legislation that has been 
enacted, including its implications for access to essential medicines. The intention behind this 
dissertation is to assess the efficacy of the intellectual property legislation in South Africa and 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic has received a great deal of attention because of its high 
prevalence, mortality rates and catastrophic socio-economic effects. According to Statistics 
South Africa, in 2010 the HIV prevalence rate was estimated to be 10,5% - the total number 
of people living with HIV is estimated at approximately 5,24 million.
1
 With regards to the 
age group 15–49, approximately 17% of South African citizens were infected with HIV.
2
 
Although there is no cure for HIV, there have been important advances in technology and 
medicine which have enhanced public health and prolonged life expectancy.
3
 Despite the 
existence of new combinations of antiretroviral therapy and other medicines, nearly half of 
those infected with HIV/AIDS who require treatment lack access to it.
4
 As a consequence of 
economic inequities and extensive poverty, most originator pharmaceutical companies do not 
deem it profitable to develop new medicines for sale in developing countries or to lower the 




The lack of access to medicines is not only a public health crisis, but also represents a human 
rights challenge. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) affirms each person‘s right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health.
6
 Furthermore, this right incorporates access to essential 
medicines as ―a minimum core obligation of State Parties.‖
7
 South Africa has not yet ratified 
this Covenant, but became a signatory in 1994.  
 
                                                 
1
 Statistics South Africa: Statistical Release ‗Mid-Year Population Estimates 2010‘ (2010) 1, 3 available at 




AJ Anderson ―Global Pharmaceutical Patent Law in Developing Countries- Amending TRIPS to Promote 
Access for All‖ (2006), 1. 
4
 L Forman ‗―Rights‖ and wrongs: What utility for the right to health in reforming trade rules on medicines?‘ 
(2008) 10 Health and Human Rights 2, 45 available at 
http://www.hhrjournal.org/index.php/hhr/article/view/80/165, accessed on 25 on June 2012. 
5
 A Grover et al ‗Pharmaceutical companies and global lack of access to medicines: strengthening accountability 
under the right to health‘ (2012) Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics available at 
http://business.highbeam.com/6391/article-1G1-298171392/pharmaceutical-companies-and-global-lack-
access-medicines, accessed on 28 September 2012. 
6
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 3, 3 January 
1976, Article 12. 
7
 DM Chirwa „The Right to Health in International Law: Its Implications for the Obligations of State and Non-
State Actors in Ensuring Access to Essential Medicine‘(2003) 19 SAJHR 541, 542. 
9 
 
There are various factors which influence lack of access to medicines. However in most 
instances the exorbitant prices of medicines is a significant hurdle to essential treatment.
8
 The 
profit-seeking behaviour of pharmaceutical companies and strong intellectual property 
protection has exacerbated this problem.
9
 Therefore, in many developing countries it is 
considered more lucrative to sell medicines to the wealthy at higher prices than it would be to 




The connection between global trade and intellectual property has aggravated human rights 
and public health concerns surrounding the inaccessibility of essential medicines. The World 
Trade Organisation‘s (WTO) Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
Agreement
11
 is a comprehensive international instrument which has greatly impacted 
intellectual property rights protection and access to medicines in the developing world. This 
Agreement has effectively globalized intellectual property law by obliging all WTO countries 
to subscribe to the minimum international standards of protection for intellectual property.
12
 
Member States had to establish these intellectual property standards within their domestic 
legal systems, either by creating intellectual property protections in their domestic law or 




Intellectual property rights grant the rights holder exclusive control over a product for a 
limited period of time. TRIPS requires Member States to implement compulsory patent 
protection for inventions in all fields of technology for a minimum term of 20 years. A patent 
is a time-bound monopoly right which is given exclusively by the State to the inventor for the 
commercial exploitation of a scientific or technological invention; it also prevents use of the 
patented product by third parties without the patentee‘s permission.
14
 Within the 
pharmaceutical industry, patents allow for an extensive period of exclusive profit so that 
pharmaceutical companies can recoup research and development costs.
15
 In essence it costs 
                                                 
8





 Grover (note 5 above). 
11
 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf.accessed on 24 May 2012. 
12
 E t‘Hoen  et al ‗Driving a Decade of Change: HIV/AIDS, Patents and Access to Medicines to All‘ (2011) 14 
Journal of International AIDS Society 1, 2 available at http://www.jiasociety.org/content/14/1/15, accessed on 
18 August 2012. 
13
 Grover (note 5 above). 
14
 C Van Gulik ‗Impact of TRIPS on Access to Medicines and the Right to Health of Children‘ (2004), 8. 
15
 t‘Hoen (note 8 above) 8. 
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pharmaceutical companies significant amounts of money to discover, develop and acquire 
regulatory approval for a new drug.
16
 Therefore, in the absence of patent protection, imitators 
are able to free ride on the innovator‘s regulatory approval and reproduce the product at a 
smaller cost than that of the originator.
17
 Fundamentally, reproduction costs are much lower 
when compared to the costs sustained by innovators for discovering and developing a new 
medicine.
18
 Patent protection grants the patent holder with a market monopoly, free from 
market competition which allows the patent holder to charge any price; therefore medicines 




In 2001, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health was adopted.
20
 The Doha 
Declaration confirmed governments‘ right to implement measures to safeguard public health 
and granted least developed countries (LDCs) the flexibility not to grant or enforce 
pharmaceuticals patents until 2016.
21
 The Doha Declaration also reaffirmed some the TRIPS 
flexibilities that could aid access to medicines.  
 
South Africa and India are primary examples of the issues faced by WTO Member States 
whilst attempting to bring their domestic patent laws into compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement. In both countries, governments had to attempt to strike a balance between 
creating an effective intellectual property infrastructure whilst effectively realizing the 
therapeutic needs of the population affected by HIV/AIDS. 
 
The South African intellectual property legislation, which includes its patent law, is national 
law which has been in existence for more than a century.
22
 In 1806, the British conquered the 
Dutch settlers and took over the Cape Region as part of the British Empire.
23
 Within the rule, 
British patents could, in certain instances, be extended to British colonies; patent protection 
                                                 
16
 H Grabowski ‗Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries‘ 






 C Oh et al ‗TRIPS, Patents and Access to Medicines: Proposals for Clarification and Reform‘. Third World 
Network Briefing Paper (2001) available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/drugs2.htm, accessed on 15 August 
2012. 
20
 EFM t‘Hoen ‗The Global Politics of Pharmaceutical Monopoly Power: Drug patents, access, innovation and 
the application of the WTO Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health‘ (2009), xvi. 
21
 Ibid xvi. 
22
 YA Vawda ‗Tripped Up on TRIPS: The Story of Shrinking Access to Drugs in Developing Countries‘ (2002) 
13 Stellenbosch L. Rev. 325, 353. 
23
 JT Pechacek ‗The Past, Present, and Future of South Africa‘s Patent System‘ (2012) 3 Intellectual Property 
Law Review 188, 190. 
11 
 
was therefore allowed in the Cape Colony until the enactment of its own patent laws and 
could only be obtained through a British patent that was duly extended thereto.
24
 During this 
period, the Roman-Dutch common-law continued to be in force, however it was soon 
―overlaid with a heavy English law influence.‖
25
 Thereafter the Cape Colony and the Natal 
Colony enacted their own patent statutes after being granted representative government. 
These patent statutes were founded upon English patent law called the Statute of Monopolies 
of 1623.
26
 This statute was the foundation of English patent legislation, and was introduced 
into early South African patent law.
27
 In 1910, Britain unified the four territories of South 
Africa. In 1916 the Union enacted the Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and Copyright Act. This 
statute was abolished by the 1952 Patents Act, which was in turn replaced by the current 
Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
 
In 1994, South Africa signed the TRIPS Agreement.
28
 The South African Patents Act 57 of 
1978 did not comply with the Agreement in a number of respects and was subsequently 
amended by the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 38 of 1997 in an attempt to bring 
South Africa‘s patent legislation in full compliance with the Agreement.
29
 Currently, South 
Africa grants patents for new uses or formulations of existing medicines consequently 
lengthening the period of patent monopoly by allowing pharmaceutical companies to obtain 
new patents for slight modifications to existing medicines.
30
 Vawda submits that South 
Africa‘s patent legislation is more extensive than is necessary under international law, 
examples of this being disclosure standards and the process for compulsory licensing.
31
 In 
addition, it has not made use of provisions in its existing law to take steps to advance access 
to essential medicines, nor has it made the required legislative amendments consequent to the 




                                                 
24
 H Klopper et al ‗Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa‘ ED (2011) 268. 
25
 Pechacek  (note 23 above) 190. 
26




 World Trade Organisation available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm, 
accessed on 10 October 2012. 
29
 DF Sheppard ‗Patent Law in South Africa with Particular Reference to the TRIPS Agreement‘ The Journal of 
World Intellectual Property, 607 
30
 L Daniels ‗Health Advocates Eye Proposed changes to Patent Law in South Africa‘ available at 
http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?p=383#more-383, accessed on 30 August 2012. 
31
 YA Vawda ‗Pharmaceutical Innovation, Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing Country Case 
Study: South Africa‘(2011), 8. 
32
 Ibid 8. 
12 
 
India is an important example of the creative manner in which the TRIPS Agreement has 
been applied to its patent laws. In 1995, India signed the TRIPS Agreement.
33
 In 2005, in 
order to satisfy the requirements of TRIPS, the Indian government made several amendments 
to the 1970 Indian Patents Act. The first Indian patent laws were introduced in 1856 by the 
British.
34
 The intention behind this legislation was to encourage new and useful inventions 
and to encourage inventors to divulge the secret behind their inventions.
35
 The Indian Patent 
Act has been modified from time to time. For the past three decades, the 1970 Act excluded 
product patents for pharmaceuticals whilst making provision for process patents.
36
 While 
patent law authorised process patents with regards to medicines, its scope was limited.
37
 India 
has a patent system which was viewed as a model for other developing countries as it sought 
to strike a balance between the need for granting incentives to inventors whilst making sure 
―that India's developmental needs are not ignored.‖
38
 Further, its patent laws facilitated the 
entry of local pharmaceutical firms that, through reverse engineering, could develop generic 




The 2005 amendments to India's patent law extended patent protection to food, drugs and 
medicines.
40
 It adopted patentability criteria by introducing Section 3(d) into its Patent Act, 
which lists broad categories of exceptions to patentability. The following exclusions from 
patentability are important: natural substances; new uses of known substances; new forms of 
existing substances unless the new form displays increased efficacy; and methods of treating 
humans and/or animals.
41
 These provisions will effectively reduce the number of derivative 
patents being granted for pharmaceutical products. The Amendment Act also included and 




                                                 
33
 World Trade Organization (note 28 above). 
34
 R Saha ‗Management of Intellectual Property Rights in India‘ (2005) 1, 3 available at 
http://www.pfc.org.in/workshop/workshop.pdf, accessed on 25 September 2012. 
35
 RS Adukia ‗Handbook on Intellectual Property Rights in India‘ (2012) 11 available 
atwww.caaa.in/Image/34_Hb_on_IPR.pdf, accessed on 24 October 2012. 
36
 t‘Hoen (note 20 above) 56. 
37
 A Kapczynski ‗Harmonization and its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India‘s 
Pharmaceutical Sector' (2009) 97 California Law Review 1571, 1577.  
38
 A Ramanna ‗India‘s Patent Policy and Negotiations in TRIPs: Future Options for India and other Developing 
Countries (2002) available at www.iprsonline.org/ictsd/docs/ResourcesTRIPSanita_ramanna.doc, accessed on 
10 October 2012. 
39
 t‘Hoen (note 20 above) 56. 
40
 AK Hason and JE Shimotake ‗Recent Developments in Patent Rights for Pharmaceuticals in China and India‘ 
(2006) 18 Pace Int'l L. Rev 303, 309. 
41
 Section 3 of India Patent (Amendment Act) 2005. 
42
 Ibid Section 25. 
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Bearing in mind and acknowledging the extensive literature that exists on this topic, this 
dissertation seeks to review the steps South Africa‘s has taken in its compliance with the 
TRIPS Agreement with respect to the relevant intellectual property legislation that has been 
enacted, including its implications for access to essential medicines. The intention behind this 
dissertation is to assess the efficacy of the intellectual property legislation in South Africa and 
its impact on access to essential medicines.  
 
This dissertation aims to discuss some of the issues pertinent to the debate surrounding the 
TRIPS Agreement, patents and access to affordable medicines. Subsequent to this 
introduction, this dissertation is ordered into seven main chapters.  
 
Chapter II 
It provides an examination of South Africa‘s international and national socio-economic 
obligations on the right to health, thus establishing the extent of its duties regarding the right 
of access to essential medicines. 
 
Chapter III 
It provides an analysis of the key provisions guaranteed under the TRIPS Agreement and the 
duties it imposes on Member States. This includes the flexibilities and procedures under the 
TRIPS agreement which allows governments to facilitate access to essential medicines. It 
examines the restrictions on exclusive property rights of patent holders contained in the 
TRIPS Agreement. Such restrictions include parallel imports and compulsory licensing, 
which can be utilized to restrain anti-competitive practices and exploitation of intellectual 
property rights.  
 
Chapter IV 
This chapter analyses the legislative Acts adopted by South Africa relating to intellectual 
property rights and access to essential medicine. In particular, this chapter will focus on the 
Patents Act 57 of 1978; Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965 (as 
amended) and the Competition Act 98 of 1998. It will also examine the legislative steps taken 





This chapter outlines the strict patentability criteria adopted by India Act in order to become 
TRIPS-compliant. The Patent Amendment Act introduced Section 3(d) into its Patent law, 
which has been effective in curbing derivative patents being granted. In addition, the Act has 
also extended the grounds on which a patent can be opposed in the pre and post grant period. 
It also contains compulsory licensing provisions for the export of patented pharmaceutical 
products under certain circumstances. An analysis of important Indian judicial cases will be 
conducted outlining its impact on patents and access to essential medicines.  
 
Chapter VI 
This Chapter focuses on the legislative response to the TRIPS Agreement by Thailand and 




This chapter provides recommendations and a conclusion by looking at the ways in which the 
South Africa and India have complied with their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. It 
will also discuss the pertinent lessons that South Africa can learn from India and other 
jurisdictions in their application of the TRIPS Agreement to their domestic legal systems, in 


















CHAPTER II: SOUTH AFRICA’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC OBLIGATION TO ENSURE 
ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 
 
2. International Obligations: 
 
Access to health care including essential medicines is especially important where such access 
can mean the difference between life and death. Access to essential medicines is a significant 
link in realising the right to health. The right to health has been protected in many national 
constitutions. Even though access to healthcare is a prerequisite for the realisation of the right 
to health, only five countries have identified that such access is crucial for the achievement of 




Notwithstanding this omission, many countries have signed and ratified international human 
rights treaties incorporating the right to health. The main instrument in this regard is the 
ICESCR, which was adopted in 1966
44
 and since then it has become essential in defining 




2.1 Socio-Economic Obligations Contained in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: 
 
Socio-economic rights are accepted as human rights in various international human rights 
instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The ICESCR is the most 
extensively adopted convention relating to social, economic and cultural rights, providing a 
basis for the legal requirements in terms of the right to health. South Africa has not yet 
ratified this instrument; however remains signatory to it, thus confirming its obligation to 
improve access to healthcare.
46
 The duties that the Covenant enforces upon State Parties are 
provided for in Article 2(1). It instructs State Parties to take measures to the maximum of its 
                                                 
43
 K Balasubramaniam ‗Access to Essential Medicines as a Human Right‘ (2011) Politics of Medicine available 
at http://www.politicsofmedicines.org/articles/access-to-essential-medicines-as-a-human-right, accessed on 3 
August 2012. 
44
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm, accessed on 14 September 2012. 
45
 Balasubramaniam (note 43 above) 546. 
46
 R Phillips ‗South Africa‘s Right to Healthcare: International and Constitutional Duties in Relation to the 
HIV/AIDS Epidemic‘ (2004) 11 Human Rights Brief 1,9 available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/11/2phillips.pdf, accessed on 19 July 2012. 
16 
 
existing resources to progressively achieve the full realization of the rights recognised in this 
treaty.  
 
2.1.1 Access to Essential Medicines and the Right to Health: 
 
Access to essential medicine is contained in the ICESCR as a significant aspect of the right to 
health contained in article 12,
47
 which recognizes that everyone has the right to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health and instructs that these rights 
must be progressively realised. This provision suggests that there is an obligation on State 
Parties to supply essential medicines.
48
 The implementation of the ICESCR is overseen by 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) which frequently issues 
interpretative and authoritative general comments which are non-binding in nature.
49
 In 2000, 
the CESCR further defined the right to health in General Comment 14,
50
 which interpreted 





2.1.2 Duty to Provide Essential Medicines as a Core Obligation 
 
Whereas the Covenant recognises progressive realization and acknowledges the availability 
of resources,
52
 the CESCR confirmed in General Comment No. 3
53
 that States have a core 
obligation to guarantee the fulfilment ―of minimum essential levels of the rights contained in 
the Covenant,‖
54
 which includes primary health care. Furthermore, State Parties are required 
to take expeditious steps in relation to the realisation of socio-economic rights.
55
 While these 
                                                 
47
 HP Hestermeyer ‗Access to Medication as a Human Right‘ (2004) Max Plank UNYB 102,125. 
48
 Chirwa (note 7 above) 547. 
49
 HV Hogerzeil et al ‗Access to Essential Medicines as part of the Fulfilment of the Right to Health: Is it 
Enforceable through the Courts?‘ (2006), 305 available at 
http://www.who.int/medicines/news/Lancet_EssMedHumanRight.pdf, accessed on 25 July 2012. 
50
 The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, General Comment No. 14, U.N. CESCR, 22nd Sess., 
Agenda item 3, E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) paragraph 12 available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.2000.4.En?OpenDocument, accessed on 23 July 2012. 
51
 SP Marks ‗Access to Essential Medicines as a Component of the Right to Health‘ (2009) Health: A Human 
Rights Perspective  80, 90. 
52
 ICESCR (note 6 above) article 2(1).  
53
 CESCR General Comment No 3 The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (art 2(1) of the ICESCR) (5th 
session, 14 December 1990) available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4538838e10.pdf, accessed on 3 
August 2012. 
54
 Hogerzeil (note 49 above) 305. 
 
55
Chirwa (note 7 above) 548. 
17 
 
essential levels are resource-dependent, they should be given priority by State Parties in their 




The CESCR confirmed the non-derogable core obligations that States must ensure in terms of 
the right to health. These obligations include the right of access to health facilities, services 
and goods without discrimination, particularly for vulnerable or marginalized groups; the 
provision of essential medicines which has been explained in the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) Action Programme on Essential Drugs as well as the ―equitable distribution of all 




In terms of the WHO, ―essential medicines‖ are medicines which meet the health care needs 
of citizens, which are available within health systems at all times in sufficient amounts, 
suitable dosage forms, with quality, and at a price which everyone can afford.‖
58
 Access to 
essential medicines has four components: medicines must be available to everyone in 
sufficient quantity; treatment must be acceptable in terms of the culture and ethics of 
individuals and medicines must be of an appropriate quality.
59
 Accessibility in this regard 
includes: (1) ―physical accessibility (health facilities, goods and services must be within safe 
physical reach for everyone); (2) economic accessibility (health facilities, goods and services 
must be affordable to everyone); and (3) information accessibility (accessibility includes the 




In light of the above, the CESCR believes that every State Party is required to meet its 
minimum core obligations to guarantee the realisation of the minimum levels of each right. 
The South African Constitutional Court, in its interpretation of the socio-economic rights 
contained in the 1996 Constitution
61
 adopted the meaning of 'progressive realisation' and 
'available resources' that was defined by the CESCR.
62
 However, the Court rejected the 
notion of minimum core obligations because of the difficulty of determining its scope and its 
                                                 
56
 World Health Organization Fact Sheet No. 31 ‗The Right to Health‘ 25, available at 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet31.pdf, accessed on 15 August 2011. 
57
 General Comment No. 14 (note 50 above) paras 43(a)-(e). 
58
 Marks (note 51 above) 81. 
59




 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996 Constitution). 
62
 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); Minister of Health v 
Treatment Action Campaign No 2 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
18 
 
inappropriateness ―in the South African context.‖
63
 The Court did note, however, that the 
minimum core concept may be useful when determining whether ―measures taken by the 




2.1.3 Duties Imposed upon State Parties 
 
The right to health imposes obligations on States Parties, these include: the obligation to 
respect, protect and fulfil.
65
 These levels give rise to both ‗negative‘ (―abstention-bound and 




(a) The Duty to Respect 
 
Under the ICESCR, the obligation to respect requires State Parties "to refrain from interfering 
directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to health."
67
 Within the ambit of access 
to medicines, this suggests that States must refrain from preventing or limiting access to 
essential medicines. Yamin submits that laws which limit access to medicines by 





It is submitted that in terms of global trade agreements and intellectual property protection 
mechanisms; TRIPS authorizes WTO Members "to adopt measures necessary to protect the 
public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to 
their socio-economic and technological development.‖
69
 In addition, the Doha Declaration 
declared ―that the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent Member States from taking measures 
to protect public health and it should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive 
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(b) The Duty to Protect 
 
The obligation to protect requires State Parties to prevent third parties from interfering with 
the right to health. It requires State Parties to adopt legislation or other measures to guarantee 
equal access to health care and to ensure that privatisation ―does not constitute a threat to the 




The importance of the duty to protect is especially significant with regard to essential 
medicines as most pharmaceutical products are manufactured and marketed in the private 
sector. Since accessibility is a vital aspect of the right to health, State Parties are under an 
obligation to ensure that pharmaceutical manufacturers do not unduly limit access to essential 
medicines.  
 
(c) The Duty to Fulfil 
 
The obligation to fulfil requires State Parties to adopt appropriate administrative, budgetary, 





2.2 Domestic Obligation 
 
2.2.1 Socio-Economic Obligations under the 1996 Constitution 
 
The 1996 South African Constitution created and protected progressive rights and in 
particular saw the entrenchment of a variety of justiciable socio-economic rights.
73
 The 
Constitution guarantees these rights almost in the same manner as the ICESCR. However it 
goes further by incorporating other rights such as access to water and a healthy environment 
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which are not expressly provided for in the Covenant. Furthermore, the Constitution 
explicitly requires the State to take action to realise these socio-economic rights. The right to 




Section 27 is not only limited to instructing the State to refrain from unfairly interfering with 
a person‘s right to secure healthcare services. However, its importance lies in the fact that it 
imposes a positive duty upon the State to provide healthcare according to necessity rather 
than affordability.
75
 This section obliges the State to progressively realise socio-economic 
rights within its available resources by taking reasonable legislative and other measures.   
 
The Bill of Rights is ‗clearly modelled‘ on the ICESCR.
76
 The 1996 Constitution also 
recognises that socio-economic rights cannot be achieved overnight, therefore the rights must 
be realised progressively and its implementation is dependent on resources. While article 2(1) 
requires State Parties to use the ‗maximum of its available resources‘, the Constitution uses 
the phrase ‗within available resources‘, implying that the obligations placed on the 
government does not require more than what is available. The ICESCR takes a wider stance 
with regard to the use of resources. 
 
However, the provision of healthcare in the Constitution is a narrower formulation than that 
contained in the Covenant i.e. the Constitution provides for ‗a right of access‘ whereas the 
ICESCR provides for ‗a right to‘, thus requiring the South African government to facilitate 
access to these rights.
77
 The scope of this tapered right to access healthcare services is not 
clear from the wording of section 27, which provides little suggestion of what the entitlement 
to health care services encompasses, nor does it provide an explanation of the extent to which 
resource restrictions and the notion of progressive realisation could limit the State‘s 
obligation to ensure access.
78
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Sections 27 and 28 became the source of complaint regarding access to Nevirapine, which 
came before the South African Constitutional Court. The applicants, the Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC), argued that the refusal of the South African government to make 
Nevirapine available in the public health sector in order to prevent mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV breached these constitutional rights. The Court held that section 27 of 
the Constitution obliges the government to devise and implement, within its available 
resources, a comprehensive and coordinated programme to progressively realise the rights of 
pregnant women and their newborn children to have access to healthcare services.
79
 The 
Court also confirmed that the state has a duty to ensure that children are afforded the 
protection guaranteed in section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution.
80
 The South African 
government was ordered to withdraw the restrictions that prohibited Nevirapine from being 
made accessible to HIV-infected mothers. 
 
2.2.2 What are the State’s Duties 
 
Section 7(2) of the Constitution provides that the State must respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. This section goes further than international 
law by providing an additional duty, namely the duty to promote.  
 
The duty to "respect" is a negative obligation which requires the state to abstain from 
interfering with these rights, where such interference cannot be avoided; the State must take 
steps to mitigate its impact.
81
 The right not to be refused emergency medical treatment 
guaranteed in section 27(3) of the Constitution can be interpreted to give expression to the 
State‘s duty to respect socio-economic rights. In the Soobramoney case, the Constitutional 
Court found that this right requires the State not to arbitrarily refuse emergency medical 




The duty to "protect" is a positive obligation; it requires the State to protect the existing 
enjoyment of rights, and the capacity of individuals to improve their enjoyment of rights or 
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newly to have access to the enjoyment of rights against interferences from third parties.
83
 The 
duty to "promote and fulfil" is also positive in that it requires the state to employ its power to 





























                                                 
83
 Brand (note 75 above) 37. 
23 
 
CHAPTER III: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PATENTS ON ESSENTIAL 
MEDICINES 
 
Since 1995, the World Trade Organization‘s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights set international standards for intellectual property protection. 
Patents on pharmaceutical products grant pharmaceutical companies a monopoly over the 
production and marketing of medicines, therefore allowing them to charge higher drug prices 
in order to increase profits. Before the creation of the TRIPS Agreement, countries had the 
freedom to determine the length of patents; many countries did not authorise patent 
protection for pharmaceutical products whilst others excluded pharmaceutical processes from 
the ambit of patent protection.
84
 For example, in 1959 Rajagopala Ayyangar drafted policy 
recommendations to change India‘s patent system.
85
 The Ayyangar Report led to enactment 
of India‘s 1970 Patents Act, which eliminated product patent protection for pharmaceuticals 
and provided the legislative framework that permitted Indian pharmaceutical manufacturers 





The Agreement does permit limitations upon the granting of patents to ensure that 
governments are able to meet public health needs, these limitations contain (but are not 
limited to) parallel importation and compulsory licensing. However, the use of these 
mechanisms by developing countries has been constrained by the constant fear that such use 
would invite pressure and trade sanctions from developed countries in which the patent 
holding pharmaceutical companies are established, looking to safeguard the interests of those 
companies.
87
 In addition, there has been widespread public criticism regarding the legitimacy 
of patents on essential medicines. Consequently, there have been requests for amendments to 
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the Agreement as many feel that the TRIPS Agreement places excessive emphasis on private 




3.1 Justification for Patents 
 
Most governments from developing countries were afraid that the introduction of strong 
patents on essential medicines, through the TRIPS Agreement, would increase prices of 
essential drugs making them less affordable to the poor. However, the patent system has been 
justified as a mechanism to ―reward inventiveness, encourage technical progress and foster 
the dissemination of innovations.‖
89
 It is argued that patents constitute a derogation from the 
principle of free trade as it gives the inventor exclusive rights to exploit the invention.
90
 





The need for patent protection is significant as it grants the inventor a monopoly in order to 
recover research and development (R&D) costs. Consequently, this protection encourages 
future investment into R&D with the assurance of potential profit after all costs have been 
regained.
92
 Without patent protection, there may be little motivation to invest in expensive 
and risky research, for example if competitors could enter the market with an identical 
versions of a new medicine that has reached the market, it may be difficult for the inventor to 




A further justification of patents is known as the quid pro quo theory. Essentially, the patent 
system is regarded as ―a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the 
public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive 
monopoly for a limited period of time.‖
94
 The requirements of public disclosure and limited 
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duration of the patent are aimed at motivating inventors to disclose their innovations so that 




It has been argued that market exclusivity caused by patent protection has created artificial 
market conditions which have resulted in the exploitation of drug prices, thus causing the loss 
of benefits resulting from scientific developments.
96
 This is contrary to public interest, which 
demands that such benefits be available and accessible.
97
 Furthermore, despite stronger 
global patent protection introduced by TRIPS, consumers have not witnessed major increases 





Vawda submits that the research programmes of pharmaceutical companies are driven by 
purchasing power.
99
 The pharmaceutical private sector will not invest in developing essential 
medicines that treat diseases in those countries with little purchasing power.
100
 It is not 
disputed that financial incentives for research and development for new medicines is vital. 
However, from a theoretical perspective, it is uncertain whether the intellectual property 
patent system is effective as an incentive to invent especially in the context of developing 
countries.
101
 India, a developing country, was able to establish its pharmaceutical industry in 




3.2 THE TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES 
 
The TRIPS Agreement built on the existing standards of the Paris and Berne Conventions 
under the control of WIPO, introducing new minimum standards of intellectual property 
protection. These standards include a variety of flexibilities which Member States can utilise 
in order to mitigate the negative impact of strengthened intellectual property rights protection 
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on the availability of and access to essential medicines. Article 1.1 states that Member States 
have the freedom to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of the 
Agreement within their own legal system and practice. Therefore, Member States ―can 
exploit creative solutions to transpose into national law‖
103
 and have a discretion in 
determining the scope of the concepts that the Agreement simply states but does not define 
e.g. concepts such as novelty and inventiveness; or of situations of extreme urgency in terms 
of compulsory licenses.
104
 Developing countries can implement this flexibility as a defence 
against employing stronger intellectual property rights under the Agreement.  
 
This section discusses the TRIPS flexibilities that are most relevant for health. 
 
3.2.1 Patentability Criteria 
 
The TRIPS Agreement obliges all Member States to recognize patents for inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology provided they are new, involve an 
inventive step and is capable of industrial application.
105
 The Agreement does not contain any 
guidelines regarding the application of these criteria, giving Member States the flexibility to 
define their own patentability standards. This article also requires that patents be available 
and patent rights be enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention and whether 
products are imported or locally produced. 
 
Correa submits that upon an interpretation of Article 27.1, Member States are not obliged to 
adopt a specific notion of novelty, consequently they can implement a standard which 
objectively assesses whether the innovation is new or not.
106
 The second requirement that the 
invention contain a ―non-obviousness/inventive step‖ is essential because it determines the 
amount of ―technical contribution‖ needed to attain a patent.
107
 The Agreement does not 
provide a definition for this concept, therefore giving Member States the freedom to interpret 
the requirement in good faith and to adopt more or less strict criteria to apply these 
patentability criteria. As with the aforementioned requirements, the Agreement fails to define 
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what standards should be adopted with regards to industrial applicability. Correa further 
submits that Article 27.1 does not authorise the exclusion of medicines from patentability; 





Articles 27.2 and 27.3 of the TRIPS Agreement contain subject matter that Member States 
may exclude from patentability. The first is ordre public, one of the identified grounds for 
exclusion from patentability in terms of Article 27.2. Correa and Yusuf have submitted that 
there is ―no universally accepted notion of ordre public.‖
109
 However this provision gives 
Member States some flexibility to define which situations are applicable. Article 27.2 
indicates that this concept relates to among others the protection of ―human, animal or plant 
life or health‖ and applies to innovations that may cause ―serious prejudice to the 
environment.‖ Furthermore, this article allows the State to prevent the commercial 
exploitation of an invention to protect the ordre public. 
 
In addition, Article 27.3 permits Member States to exclude diagnostic, therapeutic and 
surgical methods from patentability. Although this flexibility is not directly linked to 
pharmaceutical products, countries should adopt it because it prevents patents being granted 
on items which may inevitably increase the cost of treatment and essential medicines.  
 
This provision also permits Member States to exclude plants and animals other than micro-
organisms, and ―essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other 
than non-biological and microbiological processes‖ from the ambit of patent protection. 
Thorpe submits that the ambit of this provision permits Member States to provide greater 
exclusion by excluding plant and animal varieties as well as any plant or animal even if it 




                                                 
108
 C Correa ‗Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in Developing Countries‘ (2000) The 
South Centre 1, 11. 
109
 C Correa and A Yusuf ‗Intellectual Property and International Trade: the TRIPS Agreement‘ (2008) The 
Netherlands Kluwer Law International 230. 
110
 P Thorpe ‗Study on the Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement by Developing Countries‘ Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights 18, available 




In light of TRIPS patentability criteria, many pharmaceutical companies are trying to extend 
the minimum patent term of existing medicines by acquiring patent protection on new uses of 
existing medicines. This is known as the ―evergreening‖ of patents. Temmerman submits that 
evergreening occurs before the expiration of a patent, in this instance a pharmaceutical 
company files a new application for patent protection over a slight modification of an existing 
product to resume another 20 years of protection for what is essentially the same product.
111
 
The extension of patent protection for another 20 years hinders the development and 
production of generic medicines. Since the TRIPS Agreement does not provide a definition of 
what an invention is in terms of Article 27, developing countries have the flexibility to define 
the scope of what constitutes an invention under their national laws in a manner that excludes 
new uses from patentability. 
 
Therefore developing countries should adopt strict criteria which specifically exclude the 
patenting of a new form of a known substance or the new use of known substances from 
patentability, which would directly limit prospects of ―evergreening.‖ In compliance with the 
TRIPS Agreement, India introduced patent provisions which explicitly excludes new dosages 
and different forms of the same medicine from patentability, and in particular known 




3.2.2 Exceptions to Patent Rights 
 
Article 30 of the Agreement provides ―Members may provide limited exceptions to the 
exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third 
parties.‖ 
 
While the exceptions are bound by the above qualifications, the Agreement does not provide 
a definition for ―limited exceptions‖ and therefore it can be used by developing countries to 
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pursue public health goals. This provision also suggests an intention to strike a balance 




One example of allowable exceptions is the so called early working exception. The Dispute 
Settlement Body of the WTO in the dispute between the European Union and Canada has 
provided some guidance on the interpretation of this exception.
114
 In this instance the 
Settlement Body held that a provision allowing a third party to make and use a patented 
invention with the intention of acquiring regulatory approval for a similar product was a 
legitimate exception within the context of TRIPS.
115
 This exception allows the competitor to 
use the invention without the consent of the patent holder prior to the expiration of the patent 
with the sole intention of the seeking regulatory approval for marketing the product upon 
expiry of the patent.
116
 This exception is aimed at ensuring that generic versions of the 





3.2.3 Compulsory Licenses 
 
A ―compulsory license‖ is the non-voluntary authorisation to use an invention. The patentee 
is obliged to accept the exploitation of his invention by a third person or by the government. 
It is argued that public interest in terms of access to the patented invention is given more 
weight than the private interest of the patent holder not to have his exclusive rights 
infringed.
118
 Thus, compulsory licenses can be granted to secure the production of generic 
medicines or allow for the importation from foreign producers. The most important rule 
governing the use of compulsory licenses is Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, which 
addresses uses ―of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the 
government or third parties authorized by the government.‖ 
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Article 31 does not restrict the grounds upon which compulsory licenses can be granted. 
However, it does impose certain substantive and procedural obligations. Substantively, this 
provision requires that the adequate remuneration be paid to the patent holder and that license 
granted be ―non-exclusive.‖
119
 Compulsory license applications are to be considered on their 
individual merits.
120
 This provision provides some flexibility by allowing compulsory 





Procedurally, applicants should first seek a voluntary license on reasonable terms and 
conditions from the patent holder, but this provision can be waived on the grounds of 
―national emergency orother circumstances of extreme urgency, or in cases of public non-
commercial use.‖
122
 Licenses are subject to termination when the conditions giving rise to the 
grant are no longer present.
123
 Furthermore, a successful compulsory license requires 
expeditious licensing procedures.  
 
Article 31(f) provides that compulsory licenses can be granted ―predominantly for the supply 
of the domestic market‖ of the Member State allowing them. Abbott suggests that a country 
with a manufacturing capacity can grant a compulsory license for its local manufacture and 
can also authorize export of a ―non-predominant‖ part of the production.
124
 Gupta argues that 
in terms of policy, this provision may be an impediment to less-developed countries which 
lack infrastructure and technical capabilities to build a domestic market with the ability to 
supply pharmaceutical products.
125
 The restriction on exports in Article 31(f) is not 
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It is clear that Article 31 aims to strike a balance by giving the government a right to 
authorise compulsory licenses whilst attempting to protect the patent holder‘s rights 
whenever applicable.
127
 Thus, compulsory licenses can be an important way for governments 
in developing countries to make patented pharmaceutical products available at more 
competitive prices. 
 
The Doha Declaration confirmed that each Member has the right to grant compulsory 
licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which it may be granted. ―Each 
Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including 
those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics, can represent a 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.‖
128
 Although this provision 
does not supplement the substantive content of Article 31, it provides an authoritative and 




3.2.4 Parallel Importation 
 
Parallel importation is a mechanism used to increase access to medicines. It can be defined as 
―the import and resale in a country, without the consent of the patent holder, of a patented 
product which was put on the market of the exporting country by the title holder or in another 
legitimate manner.‖
130
 A patent holder has the exclusive right to manufacture his invention 
and place it on the market. Once the patented product is placed on the market, the principle of 
exhaustion allows the patented product to be resold without the patentee‘s express 
authorization.
131
 International exhaustion allows the patented product to be imported after the 
first sale authorized by the patentee even if that sale occurred in another country.
132
 The 
patent holder is unable to prevent any consequent resale of a pharmaceutical product since 
their rights over the product have been exhausted by the act of selling it. 
 
                                                 
127
 Gupta (note 125 above) 141. 
128
 Para 5(c) of Doha Declaration. 
129
 Reichmann (note 118 above) 16. 
130
 Correa (note 108 above) 72. 
131
 Sector Strategy for Access to Medicines in COMESA ‗Introduction to WTO Decisions on TRIPS and Public 
Health‘ (2011) 1, 12 available at 
http://www.comesabusinesscouncil.org/attachments/article/31/8.%20Strategic%20Analysis%20and%20Implem





The TRIPS Agreement allows for parallel importation. This flexibility is one of the measures 
that Member States can take to protect public health under Article 8.1 of TRIPS. Article 6 
states that ―nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights.‖ Therefore, Member States have the freedom to incorporate the 
international exhaustion of rights principle in its domestic laws. Correa submits that Article 6 




Facilitating parallel importation can result in significant cost savings in order to secure 
essential medicines, which are important in resource-constrained countries. Importation of a 
patented medicine from a country where it is marketed at a cheaper price enables greater 
access to the medicine, without depriving the patent holder of his remuneration for the 
patented invention when the product was first sold. There are no procedural or remuneration 
obligations in terms of parallel importation. 
 
Paragraph 5(d) of the Doha Declaration has confirmed that each Member State is ―free to 
establish his own regime for such exhaustion without challenge‖- this is viewed as an extra 
measure for Member States wanting to adopt an international exhaustion principle that is 




3.2.5 Anti-competitive Practices 
 
The TRIPS Agreement ―envisages a balance between the promotion of technological 
innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology, in addition to a balance in the 
enjoyment of the benefits accruing to the users and producers of technology.‖
135
 These 
balances are dealt with under Articles 8, 31(k) and 40 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
The intention behind competition law is to ensure that markets are effectively contestable, 
making sure that firms are not engaging in anti-competitive practices for unlimited periods of 
time.
136
 Anti-competitive practices include a refusal to provide goods or to license 
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technologies on market terms to curb competition, merging with competitors to achieve a 






Article 8.1 provides that Member States may implement measures necessary for the 
protection of public health and nutrition and take measures to promote public interests in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development. Article 
8.2 states that appropriate measures may be required ―to prevent the abuse of intellectual 
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or 
adversely affect the international transfer of technology.‖ 
 
Article 8.2 is a ―principle‖, constituting a general rule which provides rights and duties for 
Member States.
138
 The fact that the Agreement provides a ―principle‖ as opposed to a specific 
rule indicates that it is not the intention of the treaty-makers to rule on the matter, but to give 
Member States a broad discretion in terms of implementation.
139
 This provision recognises 
that Member States are authorized to take steps to deal with the country‘s needs and 
concerns. Furthermore it does not restrain Member States from taking such steps.
140
 The 
second principle should be regarded as an interpretive standard in favour of Member States 
adopting measures which are considered essential for promoting competition and to prevent 
patent holders from abusing the monopoly position they hold, which includes engaging in 





However, Article 8.2 also contains a limitation to Member States obligation to prevent the 
aforementioned practices. It provides that the measures taken must be ―consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement‖, and it must be ―appropriate‖ to prevent such practices. 
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This provision is relevant to competition policy, dealing with the granting of compulsory 
licences whilst recognising that anti-competitive practices involving patents are particularly 
egregious. Compulsory licenses adopted as a remedy for an anti-competitive practice under 
this provision does not require any prior negotiations with the patent holder. The only 
requirement is that the anti-competitive practice is established by a procedure, either 
administratively or judicially, which exists on a national level. It is submitted that if there is a 
likelihood that the practice will persist, the competent authorities may refuse to terminate the 
anti-competitive measure, extending it further.
142
 Neither the TRIPS Agreement nor Article 
31 provides a definition of the term ―anti-competitive practice,‖ giving Member States the 
flexibility to determine what they might consider to be anti-competitive. 
 
Article 31 (k) also states the remuneration to the patent holder can be adjusted in light of his 
anti-competitive practices. The consequences of this provision are that in severe cases of anti-
competitive practices, remuneration can be omitted in its entirety.  This provision also 
expressly waives the restrictions for predominant domestic use, thus permitting the 
exportation of local production to any country where the pharmaceutical product is not under 






Article 40 establishes a system which regulates anti-competitive practices in contractual 
licences. Apart from the measures contained in Article 8.2 aimed at improving 
competitiveness in the pharmaceutical area, Member States can also take further measures to 
control the licensing practices in terms of this article.
144
 Maskus argues that upon a broad 
interpretation, this provision could extend to any potential abuse of intellectual property 
rights, which could include ―monopoly pricing, refusals to license, effectuating horizontal 
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3.2.6 The Waiver for Least Developing Countries until 2016 
 
Article 65 and 66 of the TRIPS Agreement granted least developed countries (LDCs) special 
permission not to implement the TRIPS Agreement until 2006.
146
 The Agreement provided 
for transitional periods that benefited developing countries and economies in transition, 
including LDCs.  
 
1. Article 65.2 states that any developing country Member State is entitled to delay 
compliance with the Agreement until January 2000. 
 
2. Article 65.3 states that any other Member State which was ―in the process of 
transformation from a centrally-planned into a market, free enterprise economy and 
which was undertaking structural reform of its intellectual property system and facing 
special problems in the preparation and implementation of intellectual property laws 
and regulations,‖ could also benefit from the same period of delay. 
 
3. Article 65.4 states that to the extent that a Member State was obliged ―to extend 
product patent protection to areas of technology‖ which was not protectable in its 
territory upon application of the Agreement, it could delay the application of product 
patents for an extra term of five years i.e. until 2005. 
 
Furthermore, Article 66.1 provides that in light of the special needs and requirements of least-
developed country, such Member States are not required to apply the provisions of the 
Agreement for a period of 10 years from the date of application. It is submitted that this 
provision is intended to allow LDCs greater flexibility enabling them to create an efficient 
technological base, which includes domestic pharmaceutical production.
147
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It is important to note that this period was extended by the Decision of the Council for TRIPS 
2005. In accordance with this Decision, LDCs were obliged to apply the provisions of the 
Agreement until 2013, or until such a date on which they cease to be a least-developed 
country Member State, or whichever date comes first.
148
 Furthermore, in terms of Paragraph 
7 of the Doha Declaration, least developed Member States are granted an additional ten-year 
extension until 2016, instead of 2006- not to provide or enforce pharmaceutical patent and 
data protection.  The extensions are particularly important because they lengthen the time 
frame in which Member States may consider the type of pharmaceutical intellectual property 





The transitional arrangements for LDCs are important regarding access to essential medicines 
and for the development of research and development capabilities of these countries. The 
transition period until 2016 in LDCs is an acknowledgement of the consequences of patent 





3.2.7 The Doha Declaration 
 
The Fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO was a major breakthrough regarding the 
implementation of TRIPS and access to medicines. The WTO Ministerial adopted a 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, which placed public health before commercial 
interests of patent holders and provided a comprehensive interpretation of the TRIPS 
Agreement with regards to public health. 
 
The Doha Declaration deals with ‗health problems‘ without limitation. The first two 
paragraphs expressly ―recognized the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many 
developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics . . . and the need for the Agreement to be part of the 
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wider national and international action to deal with such problems.‖ These provisions merely 
depict some of the problems facing developing countries; it does not limit the use of the 
Declaration to these three diseases or epidemics only. 
 
Paragraph 3 is an important provision regarding access to essential medicines. It recognizes 
that intellectual property protection is vital for the development of new medicines and the 
concerns relating to its effects on prices. t‘Hoen stated that this text is significance because it 
recognises the relationship between patents and exorbitant drug prices and the difficulties it 




Paragraph 4 acknowledged each country‘s right to take steps to protect public health. It 
affirmed that Member States ―agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not 
prevent members from taking measures to protect public health.‖ It further noted that the 
Agreement should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of Member States 
right to protect public health and to promote access to medicines for all. This Paragraph is 
extremely important because it gives primacy to public health considerations and clarifies 
that this principle is applicable to the entire TRIPS Agreement. Reference to ―measures to 
protect public health‖ is not limited to essential medicines only but includes vaccines, 




Paragraph 5 deals with compulsory licensing, which can be used to overcome intellectual 
property obstacles to access to medicines. This provision guarantees in 5(b) that each 
Member State ―has the right to grant compulsory licences‖ and the freedom to establish the 
grounds upon which they are authorised. 
 
In light of the ineffectiveness of Article 31 and the public health problems facing developing 
and least-developed nations without manufacturing capability, Paragraph Six of the Doha 
Declaration called for a solution to the problem inherent in Article 31(f), which stipulated 
that a compulsory license could only be granted primarily for the supply of the domestic 
market. In 2003, inattempting to find a solution to legal barriers in exporting essential 
medicines manufactured under a compulsory licence and ensuring that Member States that 
depend on import for their medicine supply could gain from compulsory licences, the WTO 
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 essentially permits a waiver of Article 
31(f) for countries that need to import generic medicines. 
 
The Decision permits any Member to export medicines made under compulsory licenses to 
countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector. This 
provision is subject to a number of conditions which includes Member States giving notice to 
the TRIPS Council, the patent holder receiving remuneration, and safeguards aimed at 
ensuring that the pharmaceutical products developed under compulsory licenses are not 




Implementation of the Decision has been criticised for a number of reasons: 
 
 Before a generic company can apply to a government to issue a compulsory license, it 
has to negotiate with the patent holder for a voluntary license. Such negotiations are 
complex and are a source of delays.
156
 
 The Decision requires that the drugs be identified through specific labelling and 
marketing, ensuring that it will be exported to the destination specified in the 
compulsory license. These measures that generic companies must comply with are 
burdensome and are a deterrent to their participation in the process.
157
 
 Furthermore, a potential importing country must send a written notification to the 
WTO TRIPS Council, affirming its objective to import pharmaceutical products. The 
requirement may result in pressure from countries whose policy and practice it is to 
discourage the grant of compulsory licenses. Although the purpose behind the 
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notification is to ensure transparency, this condition may discourage importing 




Rwanda has been the first country to make use of the August 30th Decision process to import 
generic ARVs from Canada.
159
 This was the only time that the system has been 
implemented.
160
 This mechanism has been critiqued as being difficult and onerous.
161
 This 
was due to shipments to Rwanda taking longer than necessary because ―the company seeking 
a compulsory license needed time to find an interested importing country, as well as on 
account of Rwanda‘s procurement tendering procedures.‖
162
 Due to the length of time taken 
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CHAPTER IV: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 




When a person invents something, there is a danger that their invention will be copied by 
others. If it is subsequently copied, the benefit from the product may be enjoyed by the 
person who copied the product. Before the patent and its protective mechanisms were 
introduced, this danger was common and it discouraged inventors from pursuing their 
interests or disclosing them to the world. To safeguard the interests of inventors, patent laws 
were established to protect inventors‘ rights and regulate an efficient intellectual property 




The South African Patents Act was amended by the Intellectual Property Amendment Act in 
order to render intellectual property legislation in conformity with the TRIPS Agreement. 
Daya & Vink submit that only a small number of substantive changes were involved.
165
 In 
terms of such compliance, it is submitted that South Africa‘s intellectual property laws 
contain stronger mechanisms than is necessary in order to protect intellectual property rights. 
The scope of patent legislation is wide as section 25(1) of the Act specifies that a ―patent may 
be granted for any new invention which involves an inventive step and which is capable of 
being used or applied in trade or industry or agriculture‖. Since South Africa is a not patent 
examining country- the effect is that the Companies and Intellectual Property Registration 
Office (CIPRO) does not conduct an investigation into the novelty or inventive requirements 
of the invention which results in only the documentation being confirmed and not the 
substantive nature of the product or process.
166
 Kaplan submits that the lack of a rigorous 
patent examination system and the resultant ease of acquiring a patent can result in 
companies filing a great number of patents domestically.
167
 It can be argued that the large 
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number of patent applications being granted for medicines can reduce the availability of 
generic production, restricting access to essential medicine.  
 
In addition, South Africa has made ―little use of mechanisms to limit the rights of patent 





4.1.2 Patentability Standards 
 
The purpose behind the Act is to facilitate the registration and granting of patents for 
inventions and for any related matter. The Act does not define the term ―invention‖ stating 
that an invention is something that can be patented under section 25. 
 
Despite no express mention in Section 25(1) of the place of invention or manufacture and the 
fact that the invention can be used or applied in any field of trade or industry or agriculture, it 
still has to comply with Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. In order to be patentable, an 
invention must: 
 ―be novel, 
 involve an inventive step, and 




Novelty refers to something that is new. Section 25(5) states that a new invention is one 
which ―does not form part of the state of the art immediately before the priority date of any 
claim to that invention.‖ The state of art comprises of: 
 ―all matter that has been made available to the public by written or oral description, 
by use or in any other way; 
 matter contained in an application for a patent which was both lodged and open to 
public inspection, provided that the priority date of that matter is earlier than that of 
the invention; 
 an invention used secretly and on a commercial scale within the Republic.‖169 
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A substance or composition that is employed in a new method for treatment or diagnosis of 
humans or animals can be patented even if the substance or composition formed part of the 
state of art, as long as the substance or composition has not been used before in that new 
method (section 25(9)). 
 
(ii) Inventive Step 
 
According to section 25(10), an invention is deemed to involve an inventive step ―if it is not 
obvious to a person skilled in the art, having regard to any matter which forms, immediately 
before the priority date of the invention, part of the state of the art.‖ Therefore in order to 
acquire a patent, the invention must be non-obvious. The invention will be regarded as non-
obvious or incorporating an inventive step if the enhancement to the innovation is not such 




The test for ―obviousness‖ can be described as follows: 
‗It is to identify the differences that exist between these prior art documents and the alleged invention. 
And, if there are differences, the question is then whether there has been a step forward. If there is; then 
the final question is whether it required some inventiveness or would it have been obvious to a man 






 case, Plewman JA held that the aforementioned enquiry must 
proceed further and a more structured enquiry should be undertaken, and that it would be 
"…appropriate to adopt tests formulated in certain English authorities."
173
 Citing the case of 
Mölnlycke AB and Another vs Procter & Gamble Limited and Others,
174
 a new test for the 
inventive step was introduced in the form of a four-step inquiry:  
 
―1. What is the inventive step said to be involved in the patent in suit?  
2. What was, at the priority date, the state of the art (as statutorily defined) relevant to that step?  
3. In what respect does the step go beyond, or differ from, that state of the art?  
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4. Having regard to such development or difference, would the taking of the step be obvious to the 
skilled man?‖ 
 
The requirement of inventiveness could also be used to contest a patent application by 
contending that the content of the patent application is ‗obvious‘ and does not fulfil the 
requirement of inventiveness as set out in the Act. Furthermore, it could be countered that in 
terms of section 25(9), the subject matter of an application is lacking an inventive step 
because they are founded upon existing compounds or discovered the compound, but in a 
different form. 
 
(iii) Industrial Applicability 
 
Once it is determined that the invention differs sufficiently from the prior art with regard both 
the new and inventive requirements, the final prerequisite is that the invention‘s function be 
implemented. For the invention to be patentable it must be capable of being used or applied 
in trade or industry or agriculture. It is submitted that the term ―capable of being used‖ can be 
defined as an invention being capable of creating the result intended by the invention.
175
 
Where the invention is capable of creating the intended result, it is regarded as ―useful‖, even 




4.1.3 Exclusions from Patentability: 
 
Various sections in the Act deal with exclusions from patentability. Inventions that are 
frivolous because they claim something obviously contrary to well-established natural laws 
do not qualify for patent protection.
177
 The Registrar of patents has a discretion to refuse to 
grant a patent for subject matter that may be used in a way that is contrary to law.
178
 Such 




General exclusions are contained insection 25(11) and 25(4): section 25(11) states that an 
invention of a method of treatment of the human or animal body by surgery, therapy or of 
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diagnosis shall be deemed incapable of being used or applied in trade, industry or agriculture. 
It has been suggested that this exclusion was included on ethical grounds to stop the 




The second exclusion states that a patent shall not be granted- 
―(a) for an invention, the publication or exploitation of which would be generally expected to 
encourage offensive or immoral behaviour; or 
(b) for any variety of animal or plant or any essentially biological process for the production 
of animals or plants, not being a micro-biological process or the product of such a process.‖ 
 
Vawda submits that as the ―concept of morality and offensive behaviour are relative 
concepts, particularly in a diverse and evolving society such as South Africa, it is unclear 




The Act also provides specific exclusions by distinguishing between inventions that may not 
be patentable and therefore are not deemed inventions in terms of the Act: 
―Anything which consists of—  
(a) a discovery;  
(b) a scientific theory;  
(c) a mathematical method;  
(d) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or any other aesthetic creation;  
(e) a scheme, rule or method for performing a mental act, playing a game or doing business; 
(f) a program for a computer; or 




4.1.4 Exceptions to Patentability 
 
The Patents Act does not contain any general provisions relating to the list of exceptions 
permitted under Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. However it is suggested that the 
provisions regarding infringements provide two instances of exceptions under the Act.
183
 The 
first exception is contained in section 71(1). It states that a patentee‘s rights will not be 
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infringed by the use of a patented invention on board a convention vessel, if the vessel enters 
territorial waters of the Republic, temporarily or accidentally, and the invention is used 
exclusively for the actual needs of the vessel. 
 
The second exception is contained in sections 69 and 69A which allows the making, use, 
exercise, dispose or import a patented product on a non-commercial scale, solely for reasons 
related to the development, obtaining and submission of information required which regulates 
the manufacture, production, distribution, use or sale of a product.
184
 This is also referred to 
as the early working exception.  
 
4.1.5 Compulsory Licensing 
 
The granting of compulsory licenses is provided for under dependent patents (under section 
55) and in terms of the abuse of patent rights (under section 56). 
 
(i) Dependent Patents 
 
Section 55 provides that, ―where the working of a patent (dependant patent) without 
infringement of a prior patent is dependent on the obtaining of a licence under that prior 
patent, the proprietor of the dependant patent may, if agreement cannot reached as to such 
licence with the proprietor of the prior patent, apply to the Commissioner for a licence under 
the prior patent.‖ 
 
The Commissioner may grant such licence on such conditions as he may impose, but 
including a condition that such licence shall be used only for the purpose of permitting the 
dependant patent to be worked and for no other purposes. It is further provided that the 
Commissioner will not grant such a licence unless: 
―(a) the invention claimed in the dependant patent involves an important technical advance of 
considerable economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in the prior patent; 
(b) the proprietor of the dependant patent granted the proprietor of the prior patent on 
reasonable terms, a cross-licence to use the invention claimed in the dependant patent; and 
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(c) the use authorized in respect of the prior patent is not assignable except with the 
assignment of the dependant patent.‖ 
 
(ii) Abuse of Patents 
 
Any interested person who wishes to apply for a compulsory licence may do so if he believes 
that the rights in the patent are being abused.
185
 There are four grounds under section 56(2) 
whereby an applicant can bring a compulsory licence application: 
―(a) the patented invention is not being worked in the Republic on a commercial scale or to 
an adequate extent after the expiry of a period of four years subsequent to the date of the 
application for the patent or three years subsequent to the date on which that patent was 
sealed, whichever period last expires, and there is in the opinion Commissioner no 
satisfactory reason for such non-working; 
(b) the demand for the patented article in the Republic is not being met to an adequate extent 
and on reasonable terms; 
(c) by reason of the refusal of the patentee to grant a licence or licenses upon reasonable 
terms, the trade or industry or agriculture of the Republic or the trade of any person or class 
of persons trading in the Republic, or the establishment of any new trade or industry in the 
Republic, is being prejudiced, and it is in the public interest that a licence or licences should 
be granted; or 
(d) the demand in the Republic for the patented article is being met by importation and the 
price charged by the patentee, his licensee or agent for the patented article is excessive in 
relation to the price charged in countries where the patented article is manufactured by or 
under licence from the patentee or his predecessor or successor in title.‖ 
 
The patentee or any other person who is deemed an interested party can oppose the 
application for compulsory licenses. Section 56(4)(a) states that the Commissioner has the 
authority to consider the application on its merits and can grant or refuse the application and 
include any conditions, including that the licensee has to manufacture the patented product in 
South Africa. Subject to protecting the legitimate interests of the licensee, the patentee can 
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make an application to terminate the licence if the circumstances which led to its grant cease 




In South Africa, no compulsory licences have been granted on pharmaceutical products. The 
State has yet to make use of a statutory power that entitles it to ‗use an invention for public 
purposes.‘
187
 Cameron submits that if the conditions of this government use – which includes 
the licensing of generic pharmaceutical companies as a manner in which drug prices can be 




The Syntheta case dealt with an application for compulsory licence in terms of section 56 the 
Patents Act in respect of a registered patent. The Appellant‘s founding papers was based on 
s56(2)(a) and (d) of the Act. The Appeal Court dismissed the application as it found that the 
Appellant‘s founding affidavit failed to disclose such abuse.
189
 The court addressed several 
deficiencies in Syntheta‘s application, including the apparent lack of evidence that the license 
would benefit South African public because the product was intended for export only.
190
 The 
Court was of the opinion that the applicant provided little evidence of the abuse of the patent 
right, which was the legal foundation for the granting of the compulsory license.
191
 The 
ultimate finding by the Court was influenced by the fact that the application was for a license to 
export the product commercially which did not involve any domestic use in South Africa. 
 
This case is also important as Plewman J referred to the essential quid pro quo theory of 
intellectual property law, acknowledging that patent protection is given in exchange for 




As noted earlier, the Doha Declaration clarified that Member States have the flexibility to 
grant compulsory licenses and the power to determine the grounds upon which they may be 
granted. Furthermore, they can determine what constitutes a national emergency or other 
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circumstances of extreme urgency. However, South Africa‘s intellectual property laws have 
not yet been amended to include these important flexibilities especially in the case of public 
health emergencies. 
 
4.1.6 Government Use 
 
The relevant provisions regarding government use are dealt with in terms of section 4 and 78 
respectively. Section 4 authorizes that a Minister of State has the power to use an invention 
for public purposes in terms of the conditions agreed upon with the patentee, or upon default 
of such agreement on such conditions as are determined by the commissioner on application 
by or on behalf of the Minister and after hearing the patentee. In addition, section 78 provides 
that the Minister can acquire, on terms and conditions agreed upon, any invention or patent 
on behalf of the State. Section 4 empowers the Minister of Health to grant compulsory 





4.1.7 Parallel Importation 
 
Section 45(2) of the Act deals with parallel importation by providing that ―the disposal of a 
patented article by or on behalf of a patentee or his licensee shall, subject to other patent 
rights, give the purchaser the right to use, offer to dispose of and dispose of that article.‖ 
Vawda submits that this principle is a component of our jurisprudence.
194
 In the case of 
Commissioner of Patents of Stauffer Chemical Co v Agricura Ltd, the court ―held that all 
restraints imposed by the patentee's monopoly fall away where the patented article is sold or 
disposed of by the patentee himself, his assignee or agent; and where the sale is by a licensee, 





4.1.8 Disclosure Requirements 
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Patents grant monopolies to inventors in exchange for public disclosure of the invention. 
Therefore, the full disclosure of an innovation is an essential principle of patent law.
196
 
Disclosure is dealt with in section 32 of the Patents Act, which provides that every 
specification must indicate whether it is a provisional or a complete specification, and shall 
commence with a title which sufficiently indicates the subject-matter of that invention. 
Furthermore, a complete specification must include an abstract; the inventions must be 
sufficiently described, ascertained and, where necessary, illustrated or exemplified and the 
manner in which it is to be performed in order to enable the invention to be performed by a 
person skilled in the art of such invention; and it must end with a claim(s) defining the 
invention for which protection is claimed (section 32(3)). 
 
Although the Act provides for disclosure requirements, it is submitted that this provision is 
rendered redundant in light of South Africa‘s non-existent patent examination system. As a 
result, ―the system may allow the granting of patents which fall into excluded categories, it 
may create social costs through the monitoring of non-novel patents by the various 
stakeholders, it may create market power for particular patent holders, and it may provide 




4.1.9 Opposition procedures and Examination System 
 
Upon analysis, the Patent Act does not contain any provisions permitting opposition to the 
grant of patents. Section 23 of the 1952 Patents Act stated that ―any person may within three 
months from the date of the advertisement of the acceptance of a complete specification… 
given written notice at the patent office of opposition to the grant of a patent on any‖ of the 
grounds listed therein. The 1978 Act abolished opposition proceedings. A person who wishes 
to object to a particular grant has to wait until the patent has been issued. According to 
section 34, the Registrar of Patents is obliged to examine every patent application and every 
complete specification accompanying the application before acceptance. In addition, the 
Registrar must examine the patent application in the prescribed manner, and upon compliance 
with the Act he must accept it. The examination is of a formal nature only. 
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Vawda submits that the present patent registration system lacks transparency, in that the Act 
simply requires the Registrar to conduct the prescribed ―tick-box approach‖ to all patent 
applications.
198
 Patent offices in many developing countries lack the capacity to conduct 
comprehensive investigations into patent applications.
199
 They may also hindered by laws and 
regulations that do not establish patentability standards with adequate specificity.  
 
A possible option which would improve transparency is to allow interested parties-such as 
the public- to oppose patents applications. It is interesting to note that the 2005 amendments 
to the Indian Patent Act retained its previous patent opposition procedures. It permits a pre-
grant opposition to be filed after the patent application is published and before the patent is 
granted. A further provision allows for the filing of an opposition after the date of publication 




4.1.10 Revocation of Patents 
 
The Act lists 9 grounds upon which a patent can be revoked under section 61. Fraudulent 
conduct on the part of the patent holder, which includes theft of the patented invention from 
another person, is a ground for revocation.
201
 In terms of patent documentation, the fact ―that 
the complete specification concerned does not sufficiently describe, ascertain and, where 
necessary, illustrate or exemplify the invention and the manner in which it is to be performed 
in order to enable the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art of such 
invention‖ can result in revocation.
202
 When the invention ―as illustrated or exemplified in the 
complete specification concerned cannot be performed or does not lead to results and 




When the content of a patent is obvious, the patent may be revoked because it relates to an 
unpatentable subject matter.
204
 The fact that the patent holder is not the inventor or a person 
who acquired the patent rights from the inventors serves as a ground for revocation.
205
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4.2 Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965 
 
In 1997, the Medicines and Related Substances Act Control Amendment Act was passed by 
the South African government in response to the HIV/AIDS and other epidemics and to make 
medicines more affordable.
206
 The context of this amendment was to allow the use of cheaper 
generic drugs on a mass scale. In South Africa, over a brief period of time, millions of 
citizens had been infected with HIV/AIDS and it had been estimated ―that the loss of these 
human resources will increase poverty, potentially causing the South African economy to 
lose approximately twenty percent of its GDP within twenty years.‖
207
 Thus the driving force 
behind this legislation was to access generic medicines for domestic use due to the 
HIV/AIDS crises in the country.  
 
The Act provides for (1) parallel importation of patented medicines; ―(2) generic substitution 
of off patent medicines and medicines imported and produced under compulsory licenses and 
(3) a transparent pricing system through the establishment of a pricing committee.‖
208
 In 
terms of the amendments the Minister of Health is empowered to use parallel importation to 
protect the public health. 
 
4.2.1 Parallel Importation 
 
The relevant provision facilitating parallel importation is section 15(C). It states: 
15C. Measures to ensure supply of more affordable medicines. 
The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable medicines in 
certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public, and in particular may: 
(a) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the 1978 Patents Act, 
determine that the rights with regard to any medicine under a patent granted shall not 
extend to acts in respect of such medicine which has been put onto the market by the 
owner of the medicine, or with his or her consent; 
                                                 
206
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(b) prescribe the conditions on which any medicine which is identical in composition, 
meets the same quality standard and is intended to have the same proprietary name as 
that of another medicine already registered, but which is imported by a person other 
than the person who is the holder of the registration certificate of the medicine already 
registered and which originates from any site of manufacture of the original 
manufacturer as approved by the council, may be imported. 
(c) prescribe the registration procedure for, as well as the use of, the medicine referred 
to in paragraph (b). 
 
The parallel importation measure has been the cause of confusion surrounding the Medicines 
Act. Section 15(C)(a) has caused confusion as it is unclear what "acts" are excluded from 
patent protection, since the provision only addresses medicines which have been "put onto 
the market".
209
 Upon a broad interpretation, the law could deny patent protection for patented 
medicines that have been exploited commercially, once patent holders begin to sell their 
drugs.
210
 In essence, once a patented medicine is sold, pharmaceutical companies have put 
their patented medicines "onto the market," and the Minister of Health may then authorize the 




In addition, it has been argued that allowing parallel importation eliminates the obligation of 
a medicine being registered separately.
212
 Therefore, a generic drug produced in another 
country does not need to go through the patent registration system before entering the South 
African market.
213
 Essentially, ―a medicine may be imported from another country and sold 




4.2.2 International Response to Section 15(C) 
 
South Africa came under intense pressure internationally and domestically, when it passed 
the amendments to its Medicine and Related Substances Control Act authorising parallel 
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importation, amongst other things. The U.S. government contended that the law be rescinded, 
and in 1998, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa
215
 and 39 
pharmaceutical corporations instituted legal proceedings in the High Court against the 
government, to have the legislation repealed. The debate was focused on whether the South 
African government would utilise its powers under these amendments to avoid patent 




In 1998, the USA government placed South Africa on the watch list for those countries that 
disrespected international intellectual property rights with respect to US products. Thereafter, 
the US Office of Trade instituted trade pressures against South Africa in the belief that the 
1997 Act contravened the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
Domestically, the drug companies argued that the provisions of the 1997 Medicines Act 
infringed their property rights and was therefore unconstitutional. It was further alleged that 
the Act infringed South Africa‘s international commitments under the TRIPS Agreement.
217
 
In a Notice of Motion,
218
 the companies requested the court to strike down the new sections 
15(C), 22F and 22G. These amendments allowed for parallel importation of medicines, 
generic substitution of patented and off -patent drugs and pricing control measures. The 
inclusion of these provisions would ensure the availability of affordable medicines to those 
who need them the most. 
 
Furthermore, the PMA claimed that the aforementioned sections in the Act were 
unconstitutional as it ―enables and authorizes the Minister of Health, in conflict with section 
25 of the Constitution, to deprive owners of intellectual property in respect of pharmaceutical 
products of such property, alternatively to expropriate such property without any provision 
for compensation to be paid in respect thereof.‖
219
 The companies further alleged that section 
15C was discriminatory in respect of the enjoyment of patent rights in the field of 
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pharmaceuticals, contrary to Article 27 which was binding on South Africa. In addition, the 
companies contended that section 22F discriminated unfairly against holders of 
pharmaceutical patents and in favour of manufacturers of generic medicines contrary to 
section 9 of the Constitution. 
 
Heywood submits that the measures adopted by South Africa were customary practice in 
developed countries and complied with international agreements such as the TRIPS 
Agreement.
220
 It can be argued that the legal action by the PMA was an attempt to use the 
Constitution to seize supplementary powers and safeguards for intellectual property that were 
not included under TRIPS; to interpret several ambiguities contained in the TRIPS 





The South African government released a press statement affirming the agreement between 
itself and the United States, which emphasised its ability to use parallel importing under 
section 15C, while simultaneously promising to follow through upon its obligations under the 
TRIPS Agreement.
222
 After the agreement was announced, the PMA decided that it would 
settle the matter out of court. However, about a year later, the PMA abandoned settlement 
talks and was prepared to return to court. Then, in April 2001, intense domestic and 
international pressure forced the PMA to withdraw their lawsuit, and the US government to 




4.3 Competition Act 98 of 1998 
 
4.3.1 Background and Relevant Provisions 
 
The South African Competition Act‘s Preamble expresses an intention to create a competitive 
economic environment ―focussed on development‖, which is aimed at ―balancing the 
interests of workers, owners and consumers.‖ The purpose behind the Act is ―to promote the 
efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy‖ and ―to provide consumers with 
                                                 
220
 M Heywood ‗Debunking ‗Conglomo-talk‘: A Case Study of the Amicus Curiae as an Instrument for 
Advocacy, Investigation and Mobilisation‘ (2001) AIDS Law Project available at 




 Walker (note 92 above) 211. 
223
 Lumina (note 265 above) 12. 
55 
 
competitive prices and product choices.‖
224
 There are a number of sections in the Act which 
provide a foundation upon which anti-competitive practices can be challenged. 
 
Prohibited practices are dealt with in terms of Chapter 2: Part A deals with restrictive 
horizontal practices,
225
 such as price fixing between competitors, collusive tendering or 
dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories or specific types of goods or 
services.
226
 It also makes provision for restrictive vertical practices,
227
 which includes 




The Act defines an essential facility as ―an infrastructure or resource that cannot reasonably 
be duplicated, and without access to which competitors cannot reasonably provide goods or 
services to their customers.‖
229
 Excessive price is defined as ―a price for a good or service 
which bears no reasonable relation to the economic value of that good or service; and is 




Section 8 is an important provision dealing with the abuse of dominance; this section is 
particularly significant with regard to access to essential medicines. It states: 
8 It is prohibited for a dominant firm to: 
(a) charge an excessive price to the detriment of consumers; 
(b) refuse to give a competitor access to an essential facility when it is economically 
feasible to do so: 
(c) engage in an exclusionary act, other than an act listed in paragraph (d), if the anti-
competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive, gain; or 
(d) engage in any of the following exclusionary acts, unless the firm can show 
technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive, gains which outweigh the anti-
competitive effect of its act: 
(i) requiring or inducing a supplier or customer to not deal with a competitor; 
                                                 
224
 Section 2(a);(b). 
225
 Section 4. 
226
 Section 4(1)(b). 
227
 Section 5. 
228
 Section 5(2). 
229
 Section 1(viii). 
230
 Section 1(ix). 
56 
 
(ii) refusing to supply scarce goods to a competitor when supplying those 
goods is economically feasible: 
(iii) selling, goods or service on condition that the buyer purchases separate 
goods or  services unrelated to the object of a contract, or forcing a buyer to 
accept a condition unrelated to the object of a contract; 
(iv) selling goods or services below their marginal or average variable cost; or 
(v) buying-up a scarce supply of intermediate goods or resources required by a 
competitor. 
 
There are many reasons why developing countries should use the regulatory tools available in 
terms of competition law and policy to ensure access to affordable essential medicines. 
Competition law can be used to penalise companies who have engaged in monopolisation and 
forms of anti-competitive practices that has resulted exorbitant prices or limited the 




The TRIPS Agreement recognises and accords Member States flexibility when dealing with 
anti-competitive practices. The international trade law framework under TRIPS is important 
because it provides some guidance for determining when competition policy can be invoked 




Competition law and policy is significant when implemented by an ―independent competition 
authority vested with strong investigative powers.‖
233
 Competition law can encourage 
interested parties with a mechanism whereby parties are not required to invest considerable 
resources in risky litigation. Alternatively, ―the regulatory authority may pursue the matter in 




In addition, TRIPS has granted Member States increased powers to permit the ―use of the 
subject matter of a patent without the authorisation of the right holder‖, i.e. through a 
compulsory license, where there has been an administrative or judicial determination that the 
patent-holder‘s practice has been anti-competitive, in terms of Article 31(k).   
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Section 8 has successfully been used in at least two cases to challenge anti-competitive 
practices by pharmaceutical companies. Flynn submits that in these cases, civil society 
demanded licenses based on the high prices of drugs combined with the refusal of the patent 
holders to grant licenses authorizing generic competition.
235
 The Competition Commission in 
South Africa issued an order finding that the refusals of drug suppliers to license competitors‘ 
whilst maintaining extraordinarily high prices were illegal abuses of dominance under its 
competition law. 
 
4.3.2 Hazel Tau v GlazoSmithKline and BoehringerIngelheim 
 
In 2002, a group of eleven individuals infected with HIV/AIDS, health care workers, AIDS 
organizations and a trade union filed a complaint against two multinational pharmaceutical 
companies GlazoSmithKline and BoehringerIngelheim (GSK, BI) before the South African 
Competition Commission.
236
 It was argued that these companies were engaging in anti-
competitive practices through excessive pricing of their patented ARVs in contravention of 
Section 8 of the Act. The complainants argued that taking into account R&D costs, costs of 
production, reasonable profit, and other anticipated costs, the prices that the companies 
charged were excessive and unjustifiable.
237
 Thus, it was argued, the prices charged by GSK 
and BI for their essential medicines were directly responsible for the ―premature, predictable 
and avoidable loss of life.‖ 
 
The Competition Commission agreed with this argument and held in favour of the 
complainants and found that the companies had infringed the said Act by engaging in 
excessive pricing and were found to have violated their dominant positions in their respective 
ARV markets.
238
 In addition, the Commission stated that such conduct denied generic 
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competitors with an ―essential facility‖, and therefore recommended the matter to the South 
Africa‘s Competition Tribunal to request the following: 
 
 Compulsory licenses on the patented medicines to allow any person to exploit the 
patents to market generic variations of GSK‘s and BI‘s patented medicines or fixed-
dose combinations that require these patents, in exchange for the payment of a 
reasonable royalty. 
 A penalty of 10% of the annual turnover of GSK‘s and BI‘s ARVs in South Africa for 




Before the matter could be heard by the Competition Tribunal, the companies agreed to grant 
voluntarily licenses on the contested patents to generic producers for both private and public 
sector markets, at a royalty not exceeding of 5% of the sale price of the generic versions. 
 
In 2007, South Africa‘s Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) brought a complaint against the 
multinational Merck Sharp & Dohme (MSD) for refusing to license its patent on an ARV on 
reasonable terms. Again, MSD and TAC reached a settlement whereby MSD agreed to grant 





The South African experience shows that the use of competition laws and policies can be 
used to secure access to essential medicines. It is important to recognise the role played by 
civil society, who took the lead in advancing a public health, which was ―not constrained by 
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5.1.1 Historical Background 
 
In 1947 after its independence, India retained the Indian Patent Act of 1911, a statute 
modelled on British law, as was law prior to independence.
242
 The 1970 Patent Act was an 
improvement over the British Patent Act of 1949, as its amendments were essential to 




The primary objectives of the 1970 Act were contained in section 83 which stated that: 
―(a) The patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure that the inventions are 
worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable 
without undue delay; and 
(b) That they are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the 
importation of the patented article.‖ 
 
In terms of section 2(j) of the 1970 Act, a patent may be obtained for an invention that is 
―new and useful.‖ It must relate to an ―art, process, method or manner of manufacture; 
machine, apparatus or other article.‖ 
244
 The term of patent protection was reduced from 
sixteen to fourteen years.
245
 Section 5 listed the following exclusions to patentability: food, 
medicines, drugs, or chemical substances. The Act allowed process patents but in terms of 
food, medicines, or drugs, the term of protection was five years from the date of the grant or 
seven years from the date of filing, whichever came first.
246





The Act also made provision for the issuance of general compulsory licenses, which stated 
that the Controller had the power to grant compulsory licenses where the patent rights had not 
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been commercially exploited by the patentee or available to the public in India at a 
reasonable price.
248
 In terms of this section, an application to the Controller for a compulsory 
license would be made by any person three years after sealing, limiting patent protection to 
three years only. Thus, a potential violator of a process patent for food, medicine, or drugs 
could be granted a license of right, after the patentee‘s three years of protection had expired. 
 
India was one of the signatories of the TRIPS Agreement in the Uruguay Round in 1995. 
Under the Uruguay Round, India was required to bring its domestic laws into conformity 
with the Agreement. 
 
5.1.2 Steps Taken by India to Comply with the TRIPS Agreement 
 
In 2005, India amended the Patent Act of 1970 to comply with its commitments under the 
TRIPS Agreement. It introduced patent protection for drugs, food and chemical products and 
the patent term was increased to 20 years. The amendments were seen in a negative light 
under the premise that increased patent protection would hamper the growth of the local 
pharmaceutical industry by limiting the industry‘s ability to reverse engineer and export 
drugs. As a result, the Indian pharmaceutical industry grew swiftly by producing cheaper 
versions of patented medicines for domestic use and eventually supplied the international 




As mentioned earlier, TRIPS requires Member States to safeguard pharmaceutical products 
by granting patents on all classes of products (including medicines), to grant patent protection 
for a minimum term of 20 years, and to allow patent rights to be satisfied by either importing 




As a developing country that previously failed to recognized patent protection on 
pharmaceutical products, India was entitled to take advantage of a ten-year transition period 
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in which to implement the obligations to introduce pharmaceutical product patent protection 
(TRIPS Arts. 65.2, 65.4). It is submitted that whilst India made the amendments to its Patents 
Act in order to fulfil its TRIPS obligations, the amendments also included vigorous 
application of public health safeguards which potentially has the effect of restricting the 




A detailed overview of the 2005 amendments will follow: 
 
(i) Inventions not patentable 
 
One of the important concerns related to the introduction of product patent protection is the 
patenting of known substances. Many pharmaceutical companies exploit the law to seek 
patents on known substances, claiming slight modifications to the known substance as 
inventions. This practice is known as ―evergreening‖ of patents whereby pharmaceutical 
companies file new patents over the process, method of administration, or dosage form rather 
than the main ingredient itself in an attempt to extend patent protection.
252
 ―Evergreening‖ is 
aimed to delay the entry into the market of generic medicines by obtaining as many patents 
on the known substance.
253
 Therefore, application of a strict patentability standard, which 
rejects patent protection for minor improvements on known substances is essential to 




As already explained (under 3.3.1), patents must be granted for inventions, which are ―new, 
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.‖ TRIPS does not provide a 
definition for these terms. There are two ways in which the scope of patentability can be 
limited: (1) to increase the threshold limit of patentability standards by providing a definition 
of patentability criteria and (2) to omit certain types of inventions, which do not satisfy any of 
the patentability standards.
255
 These measures would allow Member States some flexibility in 
determining their patentability standards. 
                                                 
251
 S Chaudhuri et al ‗Five Years into the Product Patent Regime: India‘s Response‘ (2010) United Nations 
Development Programme 1, 24. 
252
 LL Lee ‗Trials and TRIPS-ulations: India Patent Law and Novartis AG v. Union of India‘ (2008) 23 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 281, 285.  
253
 KM Gopakumar ‗Product Patents and Access to Medicines in India: A Critical Review of the 
Implementation of TRIPS Patent Regime‘ (2010) 3 Law and Development Review 325, 332. 
254






The Indian Patents Act utilises both measures to limit patentability by enactment of section 
3(d)
256
 in its amended patent legislation, which has the effect of restricting product patents. 
Section 3 excludes categories of inventions from patent protection because they are not 
deemed inventions within the definition of the term. Furthermore, this provision does not 
authorise the grant of patents for new uses, nor will patents be authorized for new 
formulations, combinations or chemical derivatives ―unless they differ significantly in 
properties with regard to efficacy.‖ 
 
An explanatory note supporting the above provision states that ―salts, esters, ethers, 
polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, 
combinations and other derivatives of known substance shall be considered to be the same 




This provision excludes new forms of a known substance, discovery of new property of a 
known substance, and new use of a known substance. Further, it treats ―salts, esters, ethers, 
polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, 
combinations and other derivatives of known substance‖
258
 as the same substance. Therefore, 
secondary patenting in any of the aforementioned forms is forbidden. 
 
The use of the phrase ―mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not 
result in the enhancement of the known efficacy‖ has been incorporated into the Amendment 
Act to prevent frivolous claims being processed. 
 
(ii) Immunity to ongoing generic production 
 
The TRIPS Agreement gave India and some other countries an extension until January 2005 
to grant pharmaceutical product patents. However, it was required to make provisions for 
receiving patent applications from the date of general application of the TRIPS Agreement. 
                                                 
256
 Section 3(d) has been amended to read: 
‖the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the 
known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance 
or the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or 







This transitional provision is often called the ‗mailbox‘.
259
 Therefore the Act allows generic 
manufacturers to continue producing generic versions of new medicines which are in the 
mailbox.
260
 However, this is only applicable to generic producers who have made substantial 
investments, provided they were producing and marketing the generic version prior to 2005. 
Furthermore, generic companies are required to pay a reasonable royalty to the patent holder. 
 
(iii) Pre-grant Opposition 
 
The 1970 Patents Act contained strong pre-grant opposition mechanisms. It lists several 
grounds upon which a patent could be opposed including the lack of novelty, inventive step 
or utility; that the claimed invention does not fall within qualified subject matter; or the 




The 2005 amendment has retained the ability of any interested person to oppose patent 
applications prior to its grant. There are 11 grounds listed in section 25(1)upon which ―any 
person‖ can file opposition and seek recourse to challenging frivolous and legally dubious 
patents. The amendment also provides post-grant opposition within one year from the date of 
publication on the grant of patent. The grounds are similar to pre-grant opposition. 
 
A competitor who fails to challenge a patent application at the pre-grant/post-grant stage has 
an extra opportunity in that he can seek revocation of the patent in terms of section 64 of the 
Act. Basheer submits that the amalgamation of a pre-grant opposition mechanism, a post-
grant opposition mechanism and a revocation mechanism makes India‘s intellectual property 




(iv) Compulsory Licences 
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The 1970 Patent Act has been comprehensively amended in terms of the grant of compulsory 
licence to comply with the requirements of TRIPS. It is important to note that the efficient 
and successful authorisation of compulsory licences is necessary to restrain the abuse of 
patent rights by the patentee.  
 
Section 84(1) of the 2005 Act states that after the expiry of three years from the date of grant 
of a patent, any interested person can make an application to the Controller to facilitate a 
compulsory license alleging that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the 
patented invention is not satisfied; the patented invention not available at a reasonable price 
to the public and the patented invention not being worked in India. Section 84(6) deals with 
matters that need to be taken into account in granting compulsory licenses, such as ―the 
nature of the invention, the measures already taken by the patentee to make full use of the 
invention, the ability of the applicant to work the invention to public advantage, and the 
capacity of the applicant to undertake the risk in providing capital and working the invention 
if the application were granted…‖ 
 
In order to incorporate the August 30th Decision, a new ground was introduced by the 2005 
amendment to facilitate export to countries with insufficient manufacturing capabilities. 
Section 92A states that compulsory licences will ―be available for manufacture and export of 
patented pharmaceutical products to any country having insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacity in the pharmaceutical sector for the concerned product to address public health 
problems, provided compulsory licence has been granted by such country or such country 
has, by notification or otherwise, allowed importation of the patented pharmaceutical 
products from India.‖ 
 
The term ‗shall‘ is significant as it indicates that compulsory licenses granted in terms of the 
August 30th Decision will be granted automatically without separate scrutiny or procedural 
requirements.
263
 The consequence of this provision is that since many developing countries 
do not have manufacturing capacities, Indian generic companies can supply these countries 
with essential medicines. 
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(v) The Early Working Exception 
 
The 2005 amended Act provides for an early working exception in section 107A(a) which 
legitimises ―any act of making, constructing, using, selling or importing a patented invention 
solely for uses reasonably related to development and submission of information required 
under any law for the time being in force, in India, or in a country other than India, that 
regulates the manufacture, construction, use, sale or import of any product.‖ 
 
Absent this exception, generic manufacturers would be forced to wait for the expiration of 
patents before facilitating tests required for regulatory approvals.
264
 This provision helps to 
encourage competition amongst Indian generic manufacturers, ensuring the availability of 








The 2005 amendments of the Indian Patent Act became the centre of attention when 
Novartis‘ patent application regarding the anticancer drug Glivec was rejected. The rejection 
was based on section 3(d) which prevents ―ever-greening‖ by prohibiting the patenting of 
new forms of known substances that does not display increased ―efficacy.‖ Novartis 
requested the Madras High Court to clarify this important provision in India‘s 2005 patent 
legislation, contending that it infringed the TRIPS Agreement and violated the Indian 
Constitution. 
 
5.1.3.1 Constitutional validity of section 3(d) upheld by Madras High Court (2007) 
 
In 2006, Novartis AG challenged the constitutional validity of Section 3(d) of the amended 
Act. The primary contention in its challenge to the constitutional validity of section 3(d) was 
that the term ―efficacy‖ was vague and ambiguous, therefore contravening the equality 
provision (Article 14) of the Indian Constitution. 
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The Madras High Court declined to examine whether Section 3(d) violated requirements 
contained in the TRIPS Agreement and stated that the court lacked jurisdiction to decide 
upon the validity of the amended provision. The Court further held that section 3(d) was 
neither vague nor arbitrary and did not breach the Indian Constitution. 
 
In terms of the meaning of the term ―efficacy‖, the court stated that ―efficacy is independent 
of potency of the drug,‖ and went on to hold that ―the Patent applicant should show that the 
substance so discovered has a better therapeutic effect.‖
267
 With regards to efficacy and 
therapeutic effect, the court noted that what ―the patent applicant is expected to show is, how 
effective the new discovery made would be in healing a disease/having a good effect on the 
body?‖
268
 Therefore, the court held that the patent applicant has to demonstrate an improved 
therapeutic effect in order to obtain a patent for a new form of an existing substance or for its 
derivatives.  
 
In coming to the last holding, the Court observed, ―we have borne in mind the object of 
(Section 3(d)), namely … to provide easy access to the citizens of this country to life saving 





5.1.3.2 Appeal on merits rejected on the ground of section 3(d) (2009) 
 
After a series of litigation, Novartis‘ appeal challenging the Patent Controller‘s order was 
heard by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) in 2008. In its decision issued in 
2009, the IPAB reversed the Patent Controller‘s findings on novelty and inventive step and 
found that the invention was new and involved an inventive step. However, the IPAB held 
that Novartis‘ alleged invention did not meet the standard required by section 3(d). In 
addition, Novartis was not able to prove that the invention demonstrated significantly 
improved therapeutic efficacy over the existing substance.
270
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The IPAB rejected Novartis‘ appeal and declined to grant it a patent for Glivec.
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5.1.3.3 Proceedings before the Supreme Court (2011) 
 
Challenging the IPAB‘s order, Novartis came before the Indian Supreme Court contesting the 
IPAB‘s analysis and application of section 3(d) to its patent application.  
Novartis‘ main argument is that section 3(d) that relates to ―discoveries‖ is does not apply to 
its patent application which, having fulfilled the criteria of novelty, inventive step and 
industrial application, is an ―invention‖ in terms of Indian patent law. Counsel argued that 
upon establishing that Glivec was an ―invention‖, section 3(d) could not have been applied by 
the IPAB to reject Novartis‘ patent application.  It was argued that the IPAB‘s holding 
indicated a complete non-application of mind.
272
 
Disputing the IPAB‘s holding that the term ―efficacy‖ in section 3(d) means therapeutic 
efficacy, it was argued that the IPAB erroneously relied on the Madras High Court‘s 
interpretation of the term ―efficacy‖.  Restating Novartis‘ pleadings before the IPAB on the 
interpretation of the term ―efficacy‖, it was contended that enhanced bioavailability and 
thermodynamic stability are properties that improved efficacy and that the beta-crystalline 
form of imatinibmesylate displayed both these properties.
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It was further contended that once a patent application satisfies the requirements of novelty, 
inventive step and industrial application, section 3(d) could not be interpreted or applied in a 
manner to destroy the primary purpose of patent law. Therefore using section 3(d) to disallow 
patents for inventions would sound the death knell for patents and affect research and 
development for the entire sector.
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 The Indian Express: Journalism of Courage ‗Norvartis argues for Glivec Patent at Supreme Court‘ (12 
September 2012) available at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/novartis-argues-for-glivec-patent-at-











6.1.1 Thailand’s Patent Laws 
 
Since 1975, the US pharmaceutical industry has maintained that the absence of product patent 
protection has acted as an obstacle to market entry in Thailand. The US government has 
placed trade pressure on the Thai government to implement stronger patent protection, 
through trade sanctions, ―representing US$165 million in lost export revenue for 
Thailand.‖
275
 As a result of such pressure, Thailand introduced measures which emphasized 
the interests of the pharmaceutical industry at the expense of the rights of patients, with 





In 1992, Thailand enacted the Thai Patent Act which created a legal framework for 
intellectual property protection, including pharmaceutical products. This Act introduced 
pharmaceutical product patents and extended patent life from 15 to 20 years. It permitted 
patent protection for drugs for the first time in Thailand but provided liberal opportunities for 
compulsory licensing and parallel importing to soften the impact of patent protection on drug 
prices.
277
 The Thai Patent Act was further amended in 1999 to comply with the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
 
6.1.2 Compulsory Licenses:  
 
The 1999 amendments reintroduced compulsory licences into the patent system. Section 
46(2) states that compulsory licenses can be granted on a product after 3 years ―from the 
grant of a patent or 4 years from the date of application, whichever is later,‖ where there are 
no patented products for sale in the domestic market, where they are sold ―at unreasonably 
high prices or does not meet the public demand without any legitimate reason.‖ 
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It also eliminated the Director-General's authority to issue a public invitation for compulsory 
license applications.
278
 The 1999 amendments also removed the powers of the Patents Board, 
which was empowered to require the disclosure of the production costs of medicines.
279
 The 
absence of the Patents Board made it difficult to ascertain whether drug prices were 




Section 51 of the 1999 Act provides that any ministry, bureau or department of the 
government may exercise the compulsory-licensing right in order ―to carry out any service 
for public consumption or which is of vital importance to the defence of the country or for the 
preservation or realisation of natural resources or the environment or to prevent or relieve a 
severe shortage of food, drug… or any other public service.‖ The objectives of this provision 




6.1.3 Government Use Licences in Thailand 
 
In 2006, the Thai government issued government use order for a select number of drugs such 
as efavirenz, which is an essential ARV. These orders were based on Thai government use 
provisions. In 2007 Thailand issued such orders for a number of pharmaceutical products 
such as Ritonavir+Lopinavir (ARVs) and Clopidogrel (heart disease medicine). This decision 
resulted in widespread protests from multinational pharmaceutical companies. In 2008, the 
Thai Government issued additional orders for Docetaxel, Letrozole and Imatinib. 
 
In 2007, the Thailand government decided to issue a compulsory license on an essential ARV 
called Kaletra (manufactured by Abbott). This decision resulted in a lobbying attack by 
Abbott, ―a large number of pharmaceutical industry supported groups, industry-funded 
consultants and experts.‖
282
 Accordingly, an Abbot representative stated that since the Thai 
government "decided not to support innovation by breaking the patents, Abbott will not 
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submit applications or register new medicines and will withdraw current applications in 




Abbott has kept its promise and has withdrawn the registration applications for the new form 
of Kaletra, and six other medicines that it had provided for marketing approval.
284
 Abbott 





It is submitted that Abbott‘s conduct of refusing to provide Kaletra and six other medicines 
undermines the steps taken by the Thai government to ensure access to essential medicines. 
Abbott‘s conduct can be construed as placing a greater emphasis on making profits than on 
protecting the health of citizens.  If Abbott‘s threats are left unchallenged, the consequent 
result is that the grant of future compulsory licenses by developing countries will be 
threatened, impeding access to essential medicines. 
 
6.1.4 Bristol-Myers Squibb taken to court 
 
In 2001, the AIDS Access Foundation and two HIV positive patients filed a lawsuit against 
Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS). In 1992, BMS licensed the rights to didanosine (ddl) from the 
US Government.
286
 BMS then filed a derivative patent application in Thailand for the 
purpose of protecting a particular dosage formulation. In this patent application, the invention 
was restricted to a specified dosage range of 5mg to 100mg per dosage unit.
287
 Thereafter, 
BMS amended its patent application to remove the limitation in the dosage range, which was 




This unlimited patent prevented generic companies from developing any form of ddl. After a 
campaign to try to encourage the government to authorise a compulsory licence, ddl was 
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manufactured in a powder form instead (which had an unpleasant taste and side effects).
289
 
As a result, civil society decided to dispute the grant of the patent itself. The Plaintiffs 





One of the main questions before the court was whether individuals have the right to 
challenge a patent. In giving judgment, the court held that ―medicine is one of the 
fundamental factors necessary for human beings, as distinct from other products or other 
inventions that consumers may or may not choose for consumption‖ and that ―lack of access 
to medicines due to high price prejudices the human rights of patients to proper medical 
treatment‖.
291
 In coming to this conclusion, the Thai court explicitly referred to the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. 
 
6.1.5 Exceptions to patent rights  
 
Section 36 of the 1999 Act provides for a number of exceptions, these include: 
 
 Research exception: ―any act for the purpose of study, research, experimentation or 
analysis, provided that it does not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent 
owner; 
 Parallel Importation: ―the use, sale, having in possession for sale, offering for sale or 
importation of a patented product when it has been produced or sold with the 
authorisation or consent of the patentee.‖ 
 Early Working Exception: ―any act concerning an application for drug registration, 
the applicant intending to produce, distribute or import the patented pharmaceutical 
product after the expiration of the patent term.‖ 
 
The mention of ―importation‖ in this provision constitutes an application of the international 
exhaustion of rights principle, which is not prohibited by the TRIPS. 
 









6.1.6 Opposition  
 
Section 31 of the 1999 Act states that any person who may lodge an opposition to the 
application at stake within 90 days from the date of publication of the application. Where an 
opposition has been initiated and has succeeded, the new applicant shall file the request for 
examination either within five years after publication, as in the normal case, or within one 
year after the final decision concerning the opposition has been reached, depending on which 
period expires last (section 29).  
 
6.1.7 Revocation  
 
According to section 54 of the 1999 Act, the invalidity of a patent may be challenged by any 
person. It further states that a petition to cancel an invalid patent may be submitted to the 




Before 1994, Brazilian patent legislation did not acknowledge or implement patents on 
pharmaceuticals, thus upon acceptance of the TRIPS Agreement, Brazil began to amend its 
patent laws so that it would fulfil its international obligations. Brazil did not make use of the 
10-year transition period granted under the TRIPS Agreement to recognize patents in the 
field of medicines. This transition period was offered to developing countries that did not 
recognize pharmaceutical patents previously.
292
 Chaves submits that the Brazilian legislation 
failed to adopt certain flexibilities allowed under TRIPS and, in some areas, went further than 




The Industrial Property Law was promulgated in 1996, which authorised patent protection for 
medicines developed after that time as long as the manufacturer conducts some part of the 
medicines production in Brazil.
294
 Lazzarini notes that this "local working" requirement 
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excludes drugs in existence prior to 1994 from patent protection, enabling the government to 




Compulsory licensing has been incorporated into Brazilian legislation in Article 68 which 
stipulates that a patent shall be subject to compulsory licensing if its owner exercises the 
patent right in an abusive manner or exploits economic power. Further, it may be granted 
when the patented product is not exploited inside Brazil or when the sale of the protected 
product fails to meet the needs of the market (the ―failure to work‖ requirement). Compulsory 
licenses may also be issued in cases of dependent patents, under the terms provided for in 
Article 70. Article 71 states that a compulsory license may be issued in cases of national 
emergency or public interest declared by the Federal Executive Authorities. 
 
The early working exception is significant as it promotes quicker entry of generic medicines 
into the market and enables information on the invention to be used for research.
296
 This 
flexibility is contained in Article 43. According to Article 68, parallel imports can be utilised 
in a limited way- its use is restricted to situations in which a compulsory license has been 
issued in virtue of abuse of economic power or in cases of national emergency and public 
interest. 
 
Given the importance of pharmaceutical products, Brazilian lawmakers considered the grant 
of patents important enough for each individual case to warrant the most rigorous and 
technical examination possible by the State. Therefore prior consent by ANVISA (Brazilian 
Health Regulatory Agency) is required before a patent can be granted.
297
 The rationale is 
essentially, patent protection should pursue a stricter standard ensuring genuine innovations 
and preventing ―monopolistic practices on products that are already known, hindering access 




In 1999, the President of Brazil issued a decree regarding principles regulating compulsory 
licensing using an additional provision in the 1996 Act which allows the grant of compulsory 
                                                 
295
 Z Lazzarini ‗Making Access to Pharmaceuticals a Reality: Legal Options Under TRIPS and the Case of 
Brazil‘ (2003) 6 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 103, 129. 
296
 Chaves (note 292 above) 169. 
297
 Ibid 170. 
298
 Working Group of Intellectual Property ‗Private interests and the connivance of the State: the case of 
pharmaceutical patents and ANVISA‘s role‘ (2011) 1, 1 available at 
http://patentes.org.br/media/file/nota%20anuencia%20ingles_ing_jan11.pdf, accessed on 24 October 2012. 
74 
 





In Brazil, the threat of compulsory licenses was a significant strategy employed to pressure 
drug companies in price negotiations for essential medications.
300
 For example, in 2001 the 
Brazilian Health Minister proclaimed that the government would issue a compulsory license 
for the production of the ARV nelfinavir, to a Brazilian pharmaceutical producer.
301
 On 
August 28, the Brazilian Health Minister and Roche resumed talks and reached an agreement 
whereby the drug would be sold at an additional 40% discount and that Brazil will not issue 
the license.
302
 In 2007 Brazil granted its first compulsory license to import efavirenz, a 








India‘s patent legislation has set an excellent example of the creative manner in which the 
TRIPS Agreement can be implemented in domestic systems. It has adopted into their national 
legislation many of the flexibilities allowed under the TRIPS to protect medicine access. 
South Africa has failed to follow suit. It is submitted that the introduction of section 3(d) has 
created stricter criteria for obtaining product patents, resulting in fewer patent monopolies 
being created and creating more space for generic competition to enter the market.  
 
South Africa can learn from India‘s example by rejecting new use and new formulation 
patents, as currently being employed in section 3(d) of India‘s patent laws. Currently South 
Africa‘s patent legislation does not exclude new uses and new patents from patentability; this 
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may result in many patent applications being granted and has a direct impact on the cost of 
essential medicines in South Africa, whereas in India affordable generics are available. 
 
South Africa should also follow India‘s lead with regards to procedures relating to opposition 
by third parties. The Indian experience has shown us that opposition to the grant of patent 
applications especially secondary patent applications can help curb the number of such 
applications being granted. A prime of example of this is the Novartis case. Should Novartis 
win in the matter; the consequent result would be patents being granted for minor changes to 
patented inventions, therefore blocking the competition among multiple generic producers. It 
would also allow other pharmaceutical companies have pending patent applications to easily 
pursue patents on new forms of these medicines.  
 
India‘s patent law allows for interested persons to apply for a compulsory license, which may 
be granted if the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonable price. The 
2005 amendment Act also provides that compulsory licenses for manufacture and export are 
allowed for countries without sufficient manufacturing capacity. South Africa allows for 
compulsory licenses to be granted to prevent the abuse of a patent but does not explicitly 
allow them as a way of protecting public health. In addition, South Africa‘s Patents Act does 




Thailand has been exemplary with regards to compulsory licensing. Lessons that can be 
learnt from Thailand‘s experience in compulsory licensing include: ―middle-income countries 
are unable to pay the high prices of multinational pharmaceutical companies; compulsory 
licensing has brought treatment with newer ARVs within reach in Thailand, but has resulted 
in pressure from industry and the US government; and an informed and engaged civil society 




In South Africa, the patent office does not examine the merits of each patent application. As a 
consequence, patents are granted for inventions even though they do not amount to a real 
innovation. The South African Patents Act needs to follow the measures taken by Brazil, to 
76 
 
compel the Patent Office to carry out full, rigorous and thorough reviews of all patent 
applications relating to medicines. In addition, the requirement of prior consent by the 
Brazilian health authority before a patent application is granted has played an important role 

































CHAPTER VII: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The TRIPS Agreement sets international standards of intellectual property protection that 
Member States are required to uphold in their domestic legislation. It obliges Member States 
to provide patent protection on pharmaceuticals and all other products for a minimum term of 
20 years. During this period the patent holder is granted a monopoly and exclusive rights to 
market the medicine.  Given that pharmaceutical companies face no competition during the 
patent period, they often charge extremely high prices in order to maximize profits.  
 
Given the fact that most developing countries were afraid that the introduction of patents on 
essential medicines through the TRIPS Agreement would increase prices of essential 
medicines making them less affordable, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health was concluded in 2001. The Doha Declaration is significant because it affirmed 
each government‘s right to implement measures to protect public health and that the TRIPS 
agreement ―should be interpreted in a manner supportive of WTO Members‘ right to protect 
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicine for all.‖ 
 
It is submitted that South Africa has not fully utilised the public health flexibilities contained 
in the TRIPS agreement in its intellectual property legislation. For example, under the South 
African Patents Act, the patentability criterion is weaker as it grants patents for so-called 
―new use‖ and ―new formulation‖ of existing medicines. By allowing new patents to be 
granted on existing medicines, pharmaceutical companies are given a monopoly ensuring that 
they have market exclusivity beyond the 20 years required under TRIPS. In addition, South 
Africa‘s does not implement a patent examination system, this results in patents being 
granted as long as administrative requirements are met. The Act also makes provision for the 
grant of compulsory licenses which has never been utilised. Furthermore, in light of the 
subsequent Doha Declaration which elevated public health over intellectual property rights, 
South Africa has failed to take steps to realise these flexibilities in its legislation. 
 
One of the most significant factors affecting access to essential medicines is that of cost. The 
consequences of weak patentability criteria and a non-examining patent system (amongst 
others things) is the subsequent ease of patent applications being granted. The likely effect 
thereto is that drug prices will dramatically increase because generic production will be 
halted. Therefore, amending our intellectual property laws to incorporate public health 
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safeguards and adopting stronger patent examination mechanisms which allow patents to be 
granted for truly genuine innovations, will not only reduce the cost of essential medicines but 
will increase access to these medicines overall. 
 
The following amendments should be made to the South African Patent Act 1978, whilst still 
complying with the TRIPS Agreement: 
 
7.1 Standards of patentability 
 
In terms of the patentability criteria under the TRIPS Agreement, South Africa has the 
flexibility to determine its own criteria for assessing patentability, therefore it has the 
freedom to set stricter standards for patentability than it does at the moment (as in the case of 
India). Adopting stricter criteria would have a direct influence on the number of patent 
applications currently being granted.  
 
In terms of the practice of ―evergreening‖, pharmaceutical companies are ever ready to file 
patent applications for slight modifications to known substances thereby extending the term 
of patent protection to another 20 years. India has been exemplary in combating this practice 
by introducing section 3(d) of the 2005 Indian Patent Amendment Act, which excludes new 
forms, new uses and new formulations of existing medicines that do not enhance therapeutic 
efficacy from patentability. 
 
It is submitted that South Africa should include a provision, similar to that of India‘s, 
explicitly prohibiting new forms, new uses and new formulations of already existing 
medicines from patentability.  
 
7.2 Patent examination 
 
Kaplan submits that the lack of proper search and examination prior to the grant of a patent 
results in the absence of an assurance that the patent is in fact valid.
304
 The absence of a 
patent examination system and the consequent ease of acquiring patents results in companies 
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filing a large numbers of patents on a local scale.
305
 A further consequence of a weak 
examination system is the granting of patents with a broad scope.
306
 As a result of not having 
an examination system, Vawda submits that this results in a large number of ‗weak‘ patents 




7.3 Compulsory licenses 
 
As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, compulsory licenses are an important flexibility 
which does not only curtail patent monopolies but also facilitates access generic medicines. 
The use of compulsory licenses has been clarified in the Doha Declaration, which affirmed 
each Member‘s right to issue compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds 
upon which such licenses are to be granted. 
 
The Patents Act makes provision for compulsory licenses which are limited to two grounds in 
the case of dependant patents (section 55) and four grounds in terms of abuse of patents 
(section 56). It is therefore submitted that the Patents Act should create more grounds upon 
which compulsory licenses can be granted, for example a provision relating to the 
inaccessibility of essential medicines because of cost implications, public health, nutrition, 
emergency etc. 
 
It is important to note that the South African has not been pro-active in issuing any 
compulsory licenses thus far.  
 
7.4 Prior Consent by Health Authorities 
 
As noted earlier, Brazil‘s patent laws require that pharmaceutical patent applications are 
reviewed by a health regulatory agency to ensure that they do not unduly impact on the 
country‘s ability to achieve the right to health. This ensures a higher and stricter standard of 
patentability which has decreased the number of pharmaceutical patents being granted 
annually. 
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It is therefore submitted that the Act must be amended to make provision for a rigorous 
examination of patent applications. A proper examination system will ensure that frivolous 
patents are not granted, thereby reducing the number of patents granted. In addition, 
provision should be made for prior consent by the Department of Health. 
 
7.5 Pre and post grant opposition 
 
The Patents Act does not make provisions for pre- or post-grant opposition of patents by any 
members of the public. The only way to challenge a patent is through court procedures. As 
noted above, India makes provision for both pre- and post- grant opposition. Accordingly, 
―any person‖ can oppose a patent while the application is pending, for a period of one year 
after it is granted. It is submitted that South Africa should amend its Patents Act to allow for 
both pre- and post-grant opposition procedures.  
 
7.6 Voluntary Licenses 
 
Although South Africa has not issued a compulsory license for patented medicines, there has 
been a trend towards voluntary licenses and use of competition laws and policies to control 
high prices of medicines.
308
 The issue surrounding voluntary licenses is that requests can 
―easily be rejected by patent-holding companies.‖
309
 Thus, government should not place over 
reliance on this mechanism and use it as an excuse not to issue compulsory licenses. 
 
In the light of the aforementioned deficiencies in our patent law, it is submitted that various 
legislative amendments need to be made to make essential medicines more affordable to 
those who need it the most. This dissertation has looked closely at the manner in which India 
has creatively utilized TRIPS provisions to not only strengthen intellectual property laws but 
also keep medicines affordable. As discussed earlier, India has adopted many of the 
flexibilities allowed under the TRIPS into their national legislation to protect access to 
medicine. The flexibilities used by India include using the extension period prior to 2005, 
granting compulsory licenses, patent opposition mechanisms and rejecting patents on new 
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formulations of existing medicines. South Africa has not taken effective steps to follow suit. 
Partly as a result of this, medicines in India are much more affordable than in South Africa.  
 
In conclusion, it is submitted that South Africa‘s intellectual property legislation has failed to 
support the government‘s constitutional commitment to realise the right to health. Section 27 
of our Constitution obliges the State to take reasonable legislative and other measures to 
progressively achieve the right of access to health care services.  
 
It is further submitted that the South African legislative framework has not been effective in 
making access to essential medicines more affordable. Although South Africa has signed the 
TRIPS Agreement, it has not taken advantage of the significant number of flexibilities 
contained in the Agreement. By amending its patent legislation to include these flexibilities, 
South Africa would ensure that stricter patentability standards are met, which would result in 
the grant of patents on inventions that are truly innovative. The consequent result of fewer 
patents being granted is that it would allow greater generic versions of medicines to enter the 
local market. This will have a direct impact on the prices of essential medicines, allowing for 
affordable prices. 
 
In essence, South Africa should implement the following flexibilities into its legislation: 
 
 Employing a stricter patentability standard will have a direct influence on the number 
of patent applications being granted. In addition, its patent legislation should be 
amended to exclude new forms, new uses and new formulations of existing medicines 
that do not enhance therapeutic efficacy from patentability.  
 The Patents Act should make provision for a rigorous patent application examination 
system which will ensure that all pharmaceutical patent applications are properly 
examined. This will have the effect of curbing the large number of weak patents being 
granted. 
 It should create more grounds upon which compulsory licenses can be granted, for 
example a provision relating to the inaccessibility of essential medicines because of 
cost, implications, public health, nutrition, emergency etc. It is further submitted that 
the South African government needs to become more proactive with regards to the 
issuance of compulsory licenses. 
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 Legislative provision should also be made for the inclusion of prior consent by the 
Department of Health. This will ensure that frivolous patents not granted, thereby 
reducing the number of patents being granted. 
 The Patents Act should be amended to make provision for both pre- and post-grant 
opposition. This should also include disclosure requirements to allow third parties to 
review patents that are pending or granted. 
 
It is submitted that the Novartis case is illustrative of the pro-active stance the Indian 
judiciary has taken when dealing with issues pertaining to intellectual property and access to 
medicines. It is important to note that if Novartis is successful, it will have disastrous 
consequences on the Indian generic industry. It may also set a negative standard for other 
countries when determining the patentability criteria that it should adopt and attempting to 
strike a balance between public health and intellectual property protection. 
 
Given the significant health needs of the country, the South African government should 
amend its patent legislation to take full advantage of the flexibilities contained in the TRIPS 
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